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Abstract. We introduce a family of logics for reasoning about relational evidence: evi-
dence that involves an orderings of states in terms of their relative plausibility. We provide
sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics. We also present several evidential ac-
tions and prove soundness and completeness for the associated dynamic logics.
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Dynamic evidence logics [2, 17–20] are logics for reasoning about the evidence and evidence-
based beliefs of agents in a dynamic environment. Evidence logics are concerned with scenarios
in which an agent collects several pieces of evidence about a situation of interest, from a number
of sources, and uses this evidence to form and revise her beliefs about this situation. The agent
is typically uncertain about the actual state of affairs, and as a result takes several alternative
descriptions of this state as possible (these descriptions are typically called possible worlds or
possible states). The existing evidence logics, i.e., neighborhood evidence logics (NEL) [2, 17–20],
have the following features:
1. All evidence is ‘binary’. Each piece of evidence is modeled as a set of possible states. This
set indicates which states are good candidates for the actual state, and which ones are not,
according to the source. Hence the name binary; every state is either a good candidate (‘in’),
or a bad candidate (‘out’).
2. All evidence is equally reliable. The agent treats all evidence pieces on a par. There is no
explicit modeling of the relative reliability of pieces of evidence.
3. One procedure to combine evidence. The logics developed so far study the evidence and beliefs
held by an agent relying on one specific procedure for combining evidence.
This work presents a family of dynamic evidence logics which we call relational evidence
logics (REL). Relational evidence logics aim to contribute to the existing work on evidence logic
as follows.
1. Relax the assumption that all evidence is binary. This is accomplished by modeling pieces of
evidence by evidence relations. Evidence relations are preorders over the set of possible states.
The ordering is meant to represent the relative plausibility of states given an evidence item.
While a special type of evidence relation – dichotomous weak order – can be used to represent
binary evidence, less ‘black-and-white’ forms of evidence can also be encoded in REL models.
2. Model levels of evidence reliability. In general, not all evidence is equally reliable. Expert
advice and gossip provide very different grounds for belief, and a rational agent should weight
the evidence that it is exposed to accordingly. To model evidence reliability, we equipped our
models with priority orders, i.e., orderings of the family of evidence relations according to
their relative reliability. Priority orders were introduced in [1], and have already been used
in other DEL logics (see, e.g. [11, 14]). Here, we use them to model the relative reliability of
pieces of evidence.
23. Explore alternative evidence aggregation rules. Our evidence models come equipped with an
aggregator, which merges the available evidence relations into a single relation representing
the combined plausibility of the possible states. The beliefs of the agent are then defined
on the basis of this combined plausibility order. By focusing on different classes of evidence
models, given by their underlying aggregator, we can then compare the logics of belief arising
from different approaches to combining evidence.
1 Relational Evidence Models
Relational evidence.We call relational evidence any type of evidence that induces an ordering
of states in terms of their relative plausibility. A suitable representation for relational evidence,
which we adopt, is given by the class of preorders. We call preorders representing relational
evidence, evidence relations, or evidence orders. As is well-known, preorders can represent several
meaningful types of orderings, including those that feature incomparable or tied alternatives.
Definition 1 (Preorder). A preorder is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive. We
denote the set of all preorders on a set X by Pre(X). For a preorder R on X and an element
x ∈ X, we define the following associated notions: R[x] := {y ∈ X | Rxy}; R< := {(x, y) ∈ X2 |
Rxy and ¬Ryx}; R∼ := {(x, y) ∈ X2 | Rxy and Ryx}.
Evidence reliability. In general, not all sources are equally trustworthy, so an agent combining
evidence may be justified in giving priority to some evidence items over others. Thus, as suggested
in [20], a next reasonable step in evidence logics is modeling levels of reliability of evidence. One
general format for this is given by the priority graphs of [1], which have already been used
extensively in dynamic epistemic logic (see, e.g., [11, 14]). In this thesis, we will use the related,
yet simpler format of a ‘priority order’, as used in [4, 5], to represent hierarchy among pieces of
evidence. Our definition of a priority order is as follows:
Definition 2 (Priority order). Let R be a family of evidence orders over W . A priority order
for R is a preorder  on R. For R,R′ ∈ R, R  R′ reads as: “the evidence order R′ has at least
the same priority as evidence order R”.
Intuitively, priority orders tell us which pieces of evidence are more reliable according to the
agent. They give the agent a natural way to break stalemates when faced with inconsistent evi-
dence.
Evidence aggregators. We are interested in modeling a situation in which an agent integrates
evidence obtained from multiple sources to obtain and update a combined plausibility ordering,
and forms beliefs based on this ordering. When we consider relational evidence with varying
levels of priority, a natural way model the process of evidence combination is to define a function
that takes as input a family of evidence orders R together with a priority order  defined on
them, and combines them into a plausibility order. The agent’s beliefs can then be defined in
terms of this output.
Definition 3 (Evidence aggregator). Let W be a set of alternatives. Let W be the set of
preorders on W . An evidence aggregator for W is a function Ag mapping any preordered family
P = 〈R,〉 to a preorder Ag(P ) on W , where ∅ 6∈ R ⊆ W and  is a preorder on R. R is
seen here as a family of evidence orders over W ,  as a priority order for R, and Ag(P ) as an
evidence-based plausibility order on W .
3At first glance, our definition of an aggregator may seem to impose mild constraints that are
met by most natural aggregation functions. However, as it is well-known, the output of some
common rules, like the majority rule, may not be transitive (thus not a preorder), and hence
they don’t count as aggregators. A specific aggregator that does satisfy the constraints is the
lexicographic rule. This aggregator was extensively studied in [1], where it was shown to satisfy
several nice aggregative properties. The definition of the aggregator is the following:
Definition 4. The (anti-)lexicographic rule is the aggregator lex given by
(w, v) ∈ lex(〈R,〉) iff ∀R′ ∈ R (R′wv ∨ ∃R ∈ R(R′ ≺ R ∧R<wv))
Intuitively, the lexicographic rule works as follows. Given a particular hierarchy  over a
family of evidence R, aggregation is done by giving priority to the evidence orders further up
the hierarchy in a compensating way: the agent follows what all evidence orders agree on, if it
can, or follows more influential pieces of evidence, in case of disagreement. Other well-known
aggregators that satisfy the constraints, but don’t make use of the priority structure, are the
intersection rule (defined below), or the Borda rule.
Definition 5. The intersection rule is the aggregator Ag∩ given by (w, v) ∈ Ag∩(〈R,
〉) iff (w, v) ∈
⋂
R.
The models. Having defined relational evidence and evidence aggregators, we are now ready to
introduce relational evidence models.
Definition 6 (Relational evidence model). Let P be a set of propositional variables. A re-
lational evidence model (REL model, for short) is a tuple M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 where W is a
non-empty set of states; 〈R,〉 is an ordered family of evidence, where: R is a set of evidence
orders on W with W 2 ∈ R and  is a priority order for R; V : P→ 2W is a valuation function;
Ag is an evidence aggregator for W . M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 is said to be an f -model iff Ag = f .
W 2 ∈ R is called the trivial evidence order. It represents the evidence stating that “the actual
state is in W”. This evidence represents full uncertainty and is taken to be always available to
the agent as a starting point.
Syntax and semantics. We now introduce a static language for reasoning about relational
evidence, which we call L . In [2], this language is interpreted over NEL models (there, the
language is called L∀0).
Definition 7 (L ). Let P be a countably infinite set of propositional variables. The language L
is defined by:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 0ϕ | ϕ | ∀ϕ (p ∈ P)
We define ⊥ := p ∧ ¬p and ⊤ := ¬⊥. The Boolean connectives ∨ and → are defined in terms of
¬ and ∧ in the usual manner. The duals of the modal operators are defined in the following way:
♦0 := ¬0¬, ♦ := ¬¬, ∃ := ¬∀¬.
The intended interpretation of the modalities is as follows. 0ϕ reads as: ‘the agent has
basic, factive evidence for ϕ’; ϕ reads as: ‘the agent has combined, factive evidence for ϕ’. The
language L is interpreted over REL models as follows.
4Definition 8 (Satisfaction). Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 be an REL model and w ∈ W . The
satisfaction relation |= between pairs (M,w) and formulas ϕ ∈ L is defined as follows:
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= 0ϕ iff there is R ∈ R such that, for all v ∈ W,Rwv implies M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ iff for all v ∈ W,Ag(〈R,〉)wv implies M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= ∀ϕ iff for all v ∈ W,M, v |= ϕ
Definition 9 (Truth map). Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 be a REL model. We define a truth
map J·KM : L → 2W given by: JϕKM = {w ∈ W |M,w |= ϕ}
Next, we introduce some definable notions of evidence and belief over REL models. Fix a
model M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉.
Basic (factive) evidence. We say that a piece of evidence R ∈ R supports ϕ at w ∈ W iff
R[w] ⊆ JϕKM . That is, every world that is at least as plausible as w under R satisfies ϕ. Using
this notion of support, we say that the agent has basic, factive evidence for ϕ at w ∈ W if there
is a piece of evidence R ∈ R that supports ϕ at w. That is: ‘the agent has basic evidence for
ϕ at w ∈ W ’ iff ∃R ∈ R(R[w] ⊆ JϕKM ) iff M,w |= 0ϕ. We also have a non-factive version
of this notion, which says that the agent has basic evidence for ϕ if there is a piece of evidence
R that supports ϕ at some state, i.e.: ‘the agent has basic evidence for ϕ (at any state)’ iff
∃w(∃R ∈ R(R[w] ⊆ JϕKM )) iff M,w |= ∃0ϕ. We can also have a conditional version of basic
evidence: ‘the agent has basic, factive evidence for ψ at w, conditional on ϕ being true’. Putting

ϕ
0ψ := 0(ϕ → ψ), we have: ‘the agent has basic, factive evidence for ψ at w, conditional on
ϕ being true’ iff ∃R ∈ R(∀v(Rwv ⇒ (v ∈ JϕKM ⇒ v ∈ JψKM ))) iff M,w |= 
ϕ
0ψ. The notion of
conditional evidence reduces to that of plain evidence when ϕ = ⊤.
Aggregated (factive) evidence. We propose a notion of aggregated evidence based on the
output of the aggregator: the agent has aggregated, factive evidence for ϕ at w ∈ W iff Ag(〈R,
〉)[w] ⊆ JϕKM iff M,w |= ϕ. The non-factive version of the previous notion is as follows: the
agent has aggregated evidence for ϕ (at any state) iff ∃w(Ag(〈R,〉)[w] ⊆ JϕKM ) iffM,w |= ∃ϕ.
As we did with basic evidence, we can define a conditional notion of aggregated evidence in ϕ
by putting ϕψ := (ϕ→ ψ). The unconditional version is given by ϕ = ⊤.
Evidence-based belief. The notion of belief we will work with is based on the agent’s plau-
sibility order, which in REL models corresponds to the output of the aggregator. As we don’t
require the plausibility order to be converse-well founded, it may have no maximal elements,
which means that Grove’s definition of belief may yield inconsistent beliefs. For this reason, we
adopt a usual generalization of Grove’s definition, which defines beliefs in terms of truth in all
‘plausible enough’ worlds (see, e.g., [3,19]). Putting Bϕ := ∀♦ϕ, we have: the agent believes ϕ
(at any state) iff ∀w(∃v((w, v) ∈ Ag(〈R,〉) and Ag(〈R,〉)[v] ⊆ JϕKM )) iff M,w |= ∀♦ϕ.
That is, the agent believes ϕ iff for every state w ∈ W , we can always find a more plau-
sible state v ∈ JϕKM , all whose successors are also in JϕKM . When the plausibility relation
is indeed converse well-founded, this notion of belief coincides with Grove’s one, while ensur-
ing consistency of belief otherwise. We can also define a notion of conditional belief. Putting
Bϕψ := ∀(ϕ → ♦(ϕ → (ϕ → ψ))), we have: ‘the agent believes ψ conditional on ϕ iff
5∀w(w ∈ JϕKM ⇒ ∃v(Ag(〈R,〉)wv and v ∈ JϕKM and Ag(〈R,〉)[v] ∩ JϕKM ⊆ JψKM )) iff
M,w |= Bϕψ. As before, this conditional notion reduces to that of absolute belief when ϕ = ⊤.
Example 1 (The diagnosis). Consider an agent seeking medical advice on an ongoing health
issue. To keep thing simple, assume that there are four possible diseases: asthma (a), allergy
(al), cold (c), and flu (f). This can be described by a set W consisting of four possible worlds,
{wa, wal, wc, wf} and a set of atomic formulas {a, al, c, f} (each true at the corresponding world).
The agent consults three sources, a medical intern (IN), a family doctor (FD) and an allergist
(AL). The doctors inspect the patient, observing fairly non-specific symptoms: cough, no fever,
and some inconclusive swelling at an allergen test spot. Given the non-specificity of the symptoms,
the doctors can’t single out a condition that best explains all they observed. Instead, comparing
the diseases in terms of how well they explain the observed symptoms and drawing on their
experience, each doctor arrives at a ranking of the possible diseases. Let us denote by RIN , RFD
and RAL the evidence orders representing the judgment of the intern, family doctor and allergist,
respectively, which we assume to be as depicted below. If the agent has no information about
how reliable each doctor is, she may just trust them all equally. We can model this by a priority
order  over the evidence orders RIN ∼ RFD ∼ RAL that puts all evidence as equally likely. On
the other hand, if the agent knows that the intern is the least experienced of the doctors, she may
give consider his evidence as strictly less reliable than the one provided by the other doctors.
Similarly, if allergist has a very strong reputation, the agent may wish to give the allergist’s
judgment strict priority over the rest. We can model this by a different priority order ′ given
by RIN ≺′ RFD ≺′ RAL (note that this is meant to be reflexive and transitive). If, e.g., the
agent uses the lexicographic rule, we arrive at the following scenarios, with different aggregated
evidence depending on the priority order used:
a
al
c
f
al
a c
f
a
al
cf
RIN RFD RAL
a
al
c
f
IN FD AL
Lexicographic aggregation based on 
∼ ∼
a
al
c
f
Lexicographic aggregation based on ′
RIN RFD RAL≺ ≺
The best candidates for the actual disease, in each case, are depicted in white. Note that,
e.g., the agent has basic evidence for a∨al∨ c, but she doesn’t have evidence for f . Moreover, in
the scenario based on ′, the agent believes that the allergy is the actual disease, but she doesn’t
in the scenario based on .
6A PDL language for relational evidence Later in this work, we will discuss evidential actions
by which the agent, upon receiving a new piece of relational evidence, revises its existing body of
evidence. To encode syntactically the evidence pieces featured in evidential actions, we will enrich
our basic language L with formulas that stand for specific evidence relations. A natural way
to introduce relation-defining expressions, in a modal setting such as ours, is to employ suitable
program expressions from Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL). We will follow this approach,
augmenting L with PDL-style evidence programs that define pieces of relational evidence. As
evidence orders are preorders, we will employ a set of program expressions whose terms are
guaranteed to always define preorders. An natural fragment of PDL meeting this condition is the
one provided by programs of the form π∗, which always define the reflexive transitive closure of
some relation.
Definition 10 (Evidence programs). The set Π has all program symbols π defined as follows:
π ::= A |?ϕ | π ∪ π | π;π | π∗
where ϕ ∈ L . Here A denotes the universal program, while the rest of the programs have their
usual PDL meanings (see, e.g., [12]). We call Π∗ := {π∗ | π ∈ Π} the set of evidence programs.
To interpret evidence programs in REL models, we extend the truth map J·KM as follows:
Definition 11 (Truth map). Let M = 〈W, 〈R,≺〉, V, Ag〉 be an REL model. We define an
extended truth map J·KM : L ∪Π → 2W ∪ 2W
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given by: JϕKM = {w ∈W |M,w |= ϕ}; JAKM =
W 2; J?ϕKM = {(w,w) ∈W 2 | w ∈ JϕKM}; Jπ ∪ π′KM = JπKM ∪ Jπ′KM ; Jπ;π′KM = JπKM ◦ Jπ′KM ;
Jπ∗KM = JπK
∗
M .
Some examples of definable evidence programs. Here are some natural types of relational
evidence that can be constructed with programs from Π∗.
Dichotomous evidence. For a formula ϕ, let πϕ := (A; ?ϕ) ∪ (?¬ϕ;A; ?¬ϕ). πϕ puts the ϕ worlds
strictly above the ¬ϕ worlds, and makes every world equally plausible within each of these two
regions. It is easy to see that πϕ always defines a preorder, and therefore (πϕ)
∗ is an evidence
program equivalent to πϕ.
¬ϕ ϕ
Fig. 1. The dichotomous order defined by πϕ.
Totally ordered evidence. Several programs can be used to define total orders. For example, for
formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, we can define the program
πt(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) := (A; ?ϕ1) ∪ (?¬ϕ1;A; ?¬ϕ1; ?ϕ2)
∪ (?¬ϕ1;¬ϕ2;A; ?¬ϕ1; ?¬ϕ2; ?ϕ3)
∪ . . .
∪ (?¬ϕ1; . . . ; ?¬ϕn;A; ?¬ϕ1; . . . ; ?¬ϕn−1; ?ϕn)
7This type of program, described in [22], puts the ϕ1 worlds above everything else, the ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
worlds above the ¬ϕ1 ∧¬ϕ2 worlds, and so on, and the ¬ϕ1 ∧¬ϕ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ϕn−1 ∧ϕn above the
¬ϕ1 ∧¬ϕ2 ∧ · · · ∧¬ϕn worlds. πt(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) always defines a preorder, so the evidence program
(πt(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn))
∗ is equivalent to it.
¬ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ϕn ¬ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ϕn−1 ∧ ϕn ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ϕ1. . .
Fig. 2. The total order defined by πt(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn).
Partially ordered evidence. Several programs can be used to define evidence orders featuring
incomparabilities. To illustrate this, let us consider the program πϕ∧ψ := (A; ?ϕ ∧ ψ) ∪ (?¬ϕ ∧
¬ψ;A; ?ϕ ∨ ψ) ∪ (?¬ϕ ∧ ψ;A; ?¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∪ (?ϕ ∧ ¬ψ;A; ?ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). As depicted in Figure 3, this
program puts the ϕ ∧ ψ worlds above everything else, the ¬ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ ∧ ¬ψ as incomparable
‘second-best’ worlds, and the ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ below everything else. As with the other programs πϕ∧ψ
always defines a preorder, so (πϕ∧ψ)
∗ is an equivalent evidence program.
¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
¬ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
ϕ ∧ ψ
Fig. 3. A partial evidence order.
Normal form programs We now introduce a ‘normal form’ lemma for the programs in Π .
This lemma shows that, for any evidence program π ∈ Π , we can find another program π′ ∈ Π ,
which is a union of certain programs, and which is equivalent to π. Of special interest for us is the
normal form established for programs of the shape π∗. The fact that every evidence program π∗
is equivalent to a program with a specific syntactic shape is used extensively in the completeness
proofs for dynamic extensions of L discussed later on. We first introduce some notation and
necessary definitions:
Notation 1. For π1, . . . , πn ∈ Π we write
⋃n
i=1 πi to denote the program π1 ∪ · · · ∪ πn. We
denote the set of all finite sequences of elements of a set X by S0(X). Moreover, we denote by
len(s) the length of a sequence s = (s1, s2, . . . , slen(s)) and by s|s
′ the concatenation of sequences
s and s′.
Definition 12 (Program equivalence). Two programs π, π′ ∈ Π are equivalent iff for every
REL model M , JπKM = Jπ
′KM .
Definition 13 (Normal form). A normal form for a program π ∈ Π is a program π′ ∈ Π such
that (1) π′ has the form
⋃
i∈I(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)∪ (?θ), where ϕi, ψi, θ ∈ L and I is a finite index set;
and (2) π and π′ are equivalent.
8The proofs for the following lemma, as well as the other results presented in this paper, can
be found in the ‘Proofs Appendix’ at the end of the paper.
Lemma 1 (Normal Form Lemma) Given any program π ∈ Π, we can find a normal
form π′ for it. In particular, the normal form for program π∗, where π has a normal form⋃
i∈I(?ϕi;A; ?ψi) ∪ (?θ), is
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?(ϕs1 ∧
∧len(s)
k=2 (∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk)));A; ?ψslen(s))
)
∪ (?⊤).
As the normal form for ∗-programs is a rather long program, we will generally use the following
abbreviation to ease reading.
Notation 2. Let I be an index set. Let s ∈ S0(I) be a sequence. We will use the following
abbreviation: s(ϕ,ψ) := (ϕs1∧
∧len(s)
k=2 (∃(ψsk−1∧ϕsk))). With this abbreviation, the union normal
form for ∗-programs will be written as
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s))
)
∪ (?⊤).
2 The Logics of Ag∩-Models and lex-Models
Static logics. We initiate here our logical study of the statics of belief and evidence in the
REL setting. We first zoom into two specific classes of REL models, the classes of Ag∩-models
and lex-models, and study the static logics for belief and evidence based on these models. In
particular, we introduce systems L∩ and Llex that axiomatize the class of Ag∩-models and the
class of lex-models, respectively. (To simplify notation, we write ∩-models instead of Ag∩-models
hereafter). In later sections, after extending our basic static language appropriately, we will ‘zoom
out’ and study the class of all REL models. Our decision to study ∩ and lex models in some detail
is as follows. The class of ∩-models is interesting because it links our relational evidence setting
back to the NEL setting that inspired it. Indeed, as we show below, given any NEL model with
finitely many pieces of evidence, we can always find a ∩-model that is modally equivalent to
it (with respect to language L ). This ∩-model represents binary evidence in a relational way,
thereby encoding the same information present in the NEL model. lex-models, on the other hand,
provide a good study case for the REL setting, as they exemplify its main novel features: non-
binary evidence and reliability-sensitive aggregation. We start by recalling the definition of a NEL
model. The definition of these models follows the one in [2]. For a more general notion, see [18],
where the models we consider are called uniform models.
Definition 14 (Neighborhood evidence model). A neighborhood evidence model is a tuple
M = 〈W,E0, V 〉 where: W is a non-empty set of states; E0 ⊆ P(W ) is a family of evidence
sets, such that ∅ 6∈ E0 and W ∈ E0; V : P → P(W ) is a valuation function. A model is called
feasible if E0 is finite.
Definition 15 (Satisfaction). Let M = 〈W,E0, V 〉 be an NEL model and w ∈ W . The satis-
faction relation |= between pairs (M,w) and formulas ϕ ∈ L is:
M,w |= 0ϕ iff there is e ∈ E0 such that w ∈ e ⊆ JϕKM
M,w |= ϕ iff there is e ∈ E such that w ∈ e ⊆ JϕKM
M,w |= ∀ϕ iff W = JϕKM
We now present a way to ‘transform’ a NEL model into a matching REL model. To do that,
we first encode binary evidence, the type of evidence considered in NEL models, as relational
evidence.
Definition 16. Let W be a set. For each e ⊆W , we denote by Re the relation given by: (w, v) ∈
Re iff w ∈ e⇒ v ∈ e.
9That is, Re is a preorder with at most two indifference classes (i.e., a dichotomous weak order)
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ candidates for the actual state, which puts all the ‘bad’ candidates strictly
below the ‘good’ ones. Having fixed this connection evidence sets and evidence orders, we can
now consider a natural way to transform every NEL into a ∩-model in which each evidence order
is dichotomous. To fix this connection, we define a mapping between NEL and REL models.
Definition 17. Let Rel be a map from NEL to REL models given by:
〈W,E0, V 〉 7→ 〈Rel(W ), 〈Rel(E0),〉, Rel(V ), Ag∩〉
where Rel(W ) :=W , Rel(V ) := V Rel(E0) := {Re | e ∈ E0} and = Rel(E0)2.
We can then observe that feasible NEL models and their images under Rel are modally equiv-
alent, in the sense of having point-wise equivalent modal theories.
Proposition 1 Let M = 〈W,E0, V 〉 be a feasible NEL model. For any ϕ ∈ L and any w ∈ W ,
we have: M,w |= ϕ iff Rel(M), w |= ϕ.
That is, feasible NEL models can be seen as ‘special cases’ of REL models in which all evidence
is dichotomous and equally reliable. As the following proposition shows, the modal equivalence
result does not extend to non-feasible NEL models. This is because, in models with infinitely
many pieces of evidence, the notion of combined evidence presented in [2] differs from the one
proposed here for REL models. To clarify this, consider a NEL model M = 〈W,E0, V 〉. Recall
that the agent has combined evidence for a proposition ϕ at w if there is a finite body of evi-
dence whose combination contains w and supports ϕ, i.e., if there is some finite F ⊆ E0 such
that w ∈
⋂
F ⊆ JϕKM . Suppose M is a non-feasible model in which we have w ∈
⋂
E0 ⊆ JϕKM ,
while no finite family F ⊆ E0 is such that w ∈
⋂
F ⊆ JϕKM . That is, the combination of all
the evidence supports ϕ at w, but no combination of a finite subfamily of E0 does. In a NEL
model like this, the agent does not have combined evidence for ϕ at w. That is, M,w 6|= ϕ.
However, our proposed notion of aggregated evidence for REL models is based on combining all
the available evidence, and as a result in Rel(M) the agent does have aggregated evidence for ϕ
(i.e., Rel(M), w |= ϕ). A concrete example of such a model is M = 〈W,E0, V 〉 with W = N,
E0 = {N \ {2n+ 1} | n ∈ N} and V (p) = {2n | n ∈ N}. It is easy to verify that M, 0 6|= p, while
Rel(M), 0 |= p.
Proposition 2 Non-feasible NEL models need not be modally equivalent to their images under
Rel. In particular, the left-to-right direction of Proposition 1 holds for non-feasible evidence
models, but the right-to-left direction doesn’t: there are non-feasible neighborhood models M s.t.
Rel(M), w |= ψ but M,w 6|= ψ.
Having motivated our interest in ∩-models via their connection to neighborhood evidence
logics, we now focus again on the static logics of ∩- and lex-models. Table 1 lists the axioms and
rules in L∩ and Llex.
Theorem 1 L∩ and Llex are sound and strongly complete with respect to ∩-models and lex-
models, respectively.
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Table 1. The systems L∩ and Llex
Axioms and inference rules System(s)
All tautologies of propositional logic both
S5 axioms for ∀, S4 axioms for , axiom 4 for 0 both
∀ϕ→ 0ϕ (Universality for 0) both
(0ϕ ∧ ∀ψ)↔ 0(ϕ ∧ ∀ψ) (Pullout) both
0ϕ→ ϕ L∩
Axioms T and N for 0 Llex
∀ϕ→ ϕ (Universality for ) Llex
Modus ponens both
Necessitation Rule for • ∈ {∀,} (from ϕ infer •ϕ) both
Monotonicity Rule for 0 (from ϕ→ ψ infer 0ϕ→ 0ψ) both
Evidence dynamics for ∩-models. Having established the soundness and completeness of the
static logics, we now turn to evidence dynamics, starting with ∩-models. In line with the work on
NEL, we consider update, evidence addition and evidence upgrade actions for ∩-models. As the
intersection rule is insensitive to the priority order, when we consider ∩-models, it is convenient to
treat the models as if they came with a family of evidence orders R only, instead of an ordered
family 〈R,〉. Accordingly, hereafter we will write ∩-models as follows: M = 〈W,R, V, Ag∩〉.
Throughout this section, we fix a ∩-model M = 〈W,R, V, Ag∩〉, some proposition P ⊆ W and
some evidence order R ∈ Pre(W ).
Update. We first consider updates that involve learning a new fact P with absolute certainty.
Upon learning P , the agent rules out all possible states that are incompatible with it. For
REL models, this means keeping only the worlds in JP KM and restricting each evidence order
accordingly.
Definition 18 (Update). The model M !P = 〈W !P ,R!P , V !P , Ag!P∩ 〉 has W
!P := P , R!P :=
{R ∩ P 2 | R ∈ R}, Ag!P∩ := Ag∩ restricted to P , and for all p ∈ P, V
!P (p) := V (p) ∩ P .
Evidence addition. Unlike update, which is standardly defined in terms of an incoming propo-
sition P ⊆ W , our proposed notion of evidence addition for ∩-models involves accepting a new
piece of relational evidence R from a trusted source. That is, relational evidence addition consists
of adding a new piece of relational evidence R ⊆ Pre(W ) to the family R.
Definition 19 (Evidence addition). The model M+R = 〈W+R,R+R, V +R, Ag+R∩ 〉 has
W+R := W , R+R := R ∪ {R}, V +R := V and Ag+R∩ := Ag∩.
Evidence upgrade. Finally, we consider an action of upgrade with a piece of relational evidence
R. This upgrade action is based on the notion of binary lexicographic merge from Andre´ka et.
al. [1].
Definition 20 (Evidence upgrade). The modelM⇑R = 〈W⇑R,R⇑R, V ⇑R, Ag⇑R∩ 〉 hasW
⇑R :=
W , R⇑R := {R< ∪ (R ∩R′) | R′ ∈ R}, V ⇑R := V and Ag⇑R∩ := Ag∩.
Intuitively, this operation modifies each existing piece of evidence R′ with R following the
rule: “keep whatever R and R′ agree on, and where they conflict, give priority to R”. To en-
code syntactically the evidential actions described above, we present extensions of L , obtained
by adding to L dynamic modalities for update, evidence addition and evidence upgrade. The
modalities for update will be standard, i.e., modalities of the form [!ϕ]ψ. The new formulas of
the form [!ϕ]ψ are used to express the statement: “ψ is true after ϕ is publicly announced”.
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Definition 21 (L !). The language L ! is defined recursively by:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 0ϕ | ϕ | ∀ϕ | [!ϕ]ϕ (p ∈ P)
Definition 22 (Satisfaction for [!ϕ]ψ). Let M = 〈W,R, V, Ag∩〉 be a ∩-model and w ∈ W .
The satisfaction relation |= between pairs (M,w) and formulas [!ϕ]ψ ∈ L ! is defined by: M,w |=
[!ϕ]ψ iff M,w |= ϕ implies M !JϕKM , w |= ψ.
For the remaining actions, we extend L with dynamic modalities of the form [+π]ψ for
addition and [⇑ π]ψ for upgrade, where the symbol π occurring inside the modality is an evidence
program.
Definition 23 (L •). Let • ∈ {+,⇑}. The language L • is defined by:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 0ϕ | ϕ | ∀ϕ | [•π
∗]ϕ (p ∈ P)
π ::= A |?ϕ | π ∪ π | π;π | π∗
The new formulas of the form [+π]ϕ are used to express the statement: “ϕ is true after the
evidence order defined by π is added as a piece of evidence”, while the [⇑ π]ϕ are used to express:
“ϕ is true after the existing evidence is upgraded with the relation defined by π”. We extend the
satisfaction relation |= to cover formulas of the form [•π]ϕ as follows:
Definition 24 (Satisfaction for [•π]ϕ). Let M = 〈W,R, V, Ag∩〉 be a ∩-model, w ∈ W and
• ∈ {+,⇑}. The satisfaction relation |= between pairs (M,w) and formulas [•π]ϕ ∈ L • is defined
by: M,w |= [•π]ϕ iff M•JπKM , w |= ϕ.
We now introduce proof systems whose logics are sound and complete with respect to ∩-
models. The soundness and completeness proofs work via a standard reductive analysis, appealing
to reduction axioms. We refer to [13] for an extensive explanation of this technique.
Definition 25 (L!, L+ and L⇑). The proof system L! extends L with the following reduction
axioms:
PA1∩: [!ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p) for all p ∈ P
PA2∩: [!ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ¬[!ϕ]ψ)
PA3∩: [!ϕ](ψ ∧ ψ
′)↔ [!ϕ]ψ ∧ [!ϕ]ψ′
PA4∩: [!ϕ]0ψ ↔ (ϕ→ 0(ϕ→ [!ϕ]ψ))
PA5∩: [!ϕ]ψ ↔ (ϕ→ (ϕ→ [!ϕ]ψ))
PA6∩: [!ϕ]∀ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ∀[!ϕ]ψ)
Let π be an evidence program with normal form
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤). The proof
system L+ extends L with the following reduction axioms:
EA1∩: [+π]p↔ p for all p ∈ P
EA2∩: [+π]¬χ↔ ¬[+π]χ
EA3∩: [+π](χ ∧ χ
′)↔ [+π]χ ∧ [+π]χ′
EA4∩: [+π]0χ↔ 0[+π]ϕ ∨
(
[+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [+π]χ))
)
EA5∩: [+π]χ↔
(
[+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) → [+π]χ))
)
EA6∩: [+π]∀χ↔ ∀[+π]χ
The proof system L⇑ extends L with the following reduction axioms:
EU1∩: [⇑ π]p↔ p for all p ∈ P
EU2∩: [⇑ π]¬χ↔ ¬[⇑ π]χ
EU3∩: [⇑ π](χ ∧ χ
′)↔ [⇑ π]χ ∧ [⇑ π]χ′
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EU4∩: [⇑ π]0χ↔ [⇑ π]χ ∧ π
<(χ) ∧ π∩(χ)
EU5∩ : [⇑ π]χ↔ [⇑ π]χ ∧ π
<(χ) ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) → [⇑ π]χ))
EU6∩: [⇑ π]∀χ↔ ∀[⇑ π]χ
where the formulas π<(χ) and π∩(χ) in EU4∩ and EU5∩ are given by:
J(ϕ) :=
∧
j∈J
ϕj ∧
∧
j′∈I\J
¬ϕj′ , J(ψ) :=
∧
j∈J
ψj ∧
∧
j′∈I\J
¬ψj′
π
∩(χ) :=[⇑ π]χ ∧
∨
J⊆I
(
J(ϕ) ∧0
(
(
∨
s∈S0(I) s.t. s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s)))→ [⇑ π]χ
))
π
<(χ) :=
∨
J⊆I
(
J(ψ) ∧ suc<(χ)
)
suc
<(χ) :=
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀
(
(ψslen(s) ∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)))→ [⇑ π]χ)
)
Theorem 2 L!, L+ and L⇑ are sound and complete with respect to ∩-models.
Evidence dynamics for lex-models.We now have a first look at the dynamics of evidence over
lex models. In the REL setting, evidential actions can be seen as complex actions involving two
possible transformations on the initial model: (i) modifying the stock of evidence, R, perhaps
by adding a new evidence relation R to it, or modifying the existing evidence with R; and (ii)
updating the priority order, , e.g. to ‘place’ a new evidence item where it fits, according to its
reliability. We may also have actions involving evidence, not about the world, but about evidence
itself or its sources (sometimes called ‘higher-order evidence‘ [8]), which trigger a reevaluation
of the priority order without changing the stock of evidence (for instance, upon learning that a
specific source is less reliable than we initially thought, we may want to lower the priority of the
evidence provided by this source). To illustrate the type of actions that can be explored in this
setting, here we study an action of prioritized addition over lex models. For the sake of generality,
we describe this action over REL models.
Prioritized addition. Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 be a REL model and R ∈ Pre(W ) a piece
of relational evidence. The prioritized addition of R adds R to the set of available evidence R,
giving the highest priority to the new evidence.
Definition 26 (Prioritized addition). The model M⊕R = 〈W⊕R, 〈R⊕R,⊕R〉, V ⊕R, Ag⊕R〉
has W⊕R := W , R⊕R := R ∪ {R}, V ⊕R := V , Ag⊕R := Ag and ⊕R:= ∪{(R′, R) | R′ ∈ R}.
To encode prioritized addition, we add formulas of the form [⊕π]ϕ, used to express the
statement that ϕ is true after the prioritized addition of the evidence order defined by π.
Definition 27 (L⊕). The language L ⊕ is given by:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 0ϕ | ϕ | ∀ϕ | [⊕π
∗]ϕ (p ∈ P)
π ::= A |?ϕ | π ∪ π | π;π | π∗
Definition 28 (Satisfaction for [⊕π]ϕ). Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 be an REL model and
w ∈ W . The satisfaction relation |= between pairs (M,w) and formulas [⊕π]ϕ ∈ L ⊕ is defined
as follows: M,w |= [⊕π]ϕ iff M⊕JπKM , w |= ϕ.
As we did with the dynamic extensions presented for actions in ∩-models, we wish to obtain
a matching proof system for our dynamic language L⊕. We do this via reduction axioms. Be-
fore presenting the proof system L⊕, we introduce some abbreviations that will be used in the
definition of these axioms.
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Notation 3. Let π be a normal form π :=
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤). For a formula
[⊕π]χ, we define the following abbreviations:
π
<(χ) :=
∨
J⊆I
(
J(ψ) ∧ suc<(χ)
)
suc
<(χ) :=
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀
(
(ψslen(s) ∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)))→ [⊕π]χ)
)
Definition 29 (L⊕). Let χ, χ′ ∈ L⊕ and let π ∈ Π∗ be an evidence program with normal
form
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)) ∪ (?⊤). The proof system L
⊕ extends L0 with the following
reduction axioms:
⊕EA1: [⊕π]p↔ p for all p ∈ P
⊕EA2: [⊕π]¬χ↔ ¬[⊕pi]χ
⊕EA3: [⊕π](χ ∧ χ′)↔ [⊕π]χ ∧ [⊕pi]χ′
⊕EA4: [⊕π]0χ↔ 0[⊕π]ϕ ∨
(
[⊕π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕π]χ))
)
⊕EA5: [⊕π]χ↔ [⊕π]χ ∧ π<(χ) ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) → [⊕π]χ))
⊕EA6: [⊕π]∀χ↔ ∀[⊕pi]χ
Theorem 3 L⊕ is sound and strongly complete with respect to lex models.
3 The Logic of REL Models
In this section, we study the logic of evidence and belief based on some abstract aggregator. That
is, instead of fixing an aggregator, we are now interested in reasoning about the beliefs that an
agent would form, based on her evidence, irrespective of the aggregator used. With respect to
dynamics, we will focus on the action of prioritized addition introduced for lex-models, considering
an iterated version of prioritized addition, defined with a (possibly empty) sequence of evidence
orders R = 〈R1, . . . , Rn〉 as input.
Definition 30 (Iterated prioritized addition). Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 be a REL model
and R = 〈R1, . . . , Rn〉 be a sequence of evidence orders.The model M⊕R = 〈W⊕R, 〈R⊕R,⊕R
〉, V ⊕R, Ag⊕R〉 has W⊕R := W , R⊕R := R ∪ {Ri | i ∈ {1, . . . n}}, V ⊕R := V , Ag⊕R := Ag and
⊕R:= ∪ {(R,R1) | R ∈ R} ∪ {(R,R2) | R ∈ R ∪ {R1}}
∪ . . .
∪ {(R,Rn) | R ∈ R ∪ {Rj | j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}}}
That is, first R1 is added as the highest priority evidence, then R2 is added as the highest priority
evidence, on top of every other evidence (including R1), and so on, up to Rn. Naturally, when
R has one element, we are back to the basic notion of prioritized addition.
Syntax and semantics. To pre-encode part of the dynamics of iterated prioritized addition,
we will modify our basic language L with conditional aggregated evidence modalities of the form
pi, where pi is a finite, possibly empty sequence of evidence programs π1, . . . , πn (i.e., πi ∈ Π∗,
for i ∈ {1, . . . n}). The intended interpretation of piϕ is “the agent would have aggregated
evidence for ϕ, if she performed the iterated prioritized addition of the evidence orders defined
by pi”.
Definition 31 (Lc). The language Lc is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 0ϕ | 
piϕ | ∀ϕ (p ∈ P); π ::= A |?ϕ | π ∪ π | π;π | π∗
where pi is a (possibly empty) finite sequence of evidence programs (i.e. ∗-programs).
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As we allow pi to be empty, pi reduces to the ϕ from L when pi is the empty sequence,
giving us a fully static sub-language.
Notation 4. We abuse the notation for the truth map J·KM and write JpiKM to denote
〈Jπ1KM , . . . , JπnKM 〉, where pi = 〈π1, . . . , πn〉.
Satisfaction for formulas piϕ ∈ Lc is given as follows.
Definition 32. Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 be an REL model and w ∈ W . The satisfac-
tion relation |= between pairs (M,w) and formulas piϕ ∈ Lc is defined as follows: M,w |=
piϕ iff Ag(〈R⊕JpiKM ,⊕JpiKM 〉)[w] ⊆ JϕKM .
That is, piϕ is true at a state w if the agent would have aggregated evidence for ϕ, assuming
that the current ordered body of evidence is transformed by the iterated prioritized addition of
JpiKM . Note that, as we allow pi to be empty, 
pi reduces to the standard ϕ from L when pi
is the empty sequence.
Static logic. Next, we introduce a complete proof system for the language with conditional
modalities.
Definition 33 (Lc). The system Lc includes the same axioms and inference rules as Llex, with
axioms and inference rules for  in Llex applying to 
pi in Lc.
Theorem 4 Lc is sound and strongly complete with respect to REL models.
Evidence dynamics for REL models. Having established the soundness and completeness of
the static logic, we now turn to evidence dynamics, focusing on prioritized evidence addition. To
encode prioritized addition, we add formulas of the form [⊕pi]ϕ, used to express the statement
that ϕ is true after the prioritized addition of the sequence of evidence orders defined by pi.
Definition 34 (L⊕c ). The language L
⊕
c is given by:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 0ϕ | 
πϕ | ∀ϕ | [⊕pi]ϕ (p ∈ P); π ::= A |?ϕ | π ∪ π | π;π | π∗
where pi is a (possibly empty) finite sequence of evidence programs (i.e. ∗-programs).
Definition 35 (Satisfaction for [⊕π]ϕ). Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 be an REL model and
w ∈ W . The satisfaction relation |= between pairs (M,w) and formulas [⊕π]ϕ ∈ L ⊕ is defined
as follows: M,w |= [⊕pi]ϕ iff M⊕JpiKM , w |= ϕ.
Having fixed our dynamic language, we now present reduction axioms for it.
Definition 36 (L⊕c ). Let χ, χ
′ ∈ L⊕pi and let pi = 〈π1, . . . , πn〉 ∈ S0(Π∗) be a sequence of
evidence programs where each πi has a normal form πi :=
⋃
s∈S0(Ii)
(?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s))∪ (?⊤).
The proof system L⊕c includes all axioms schemas and inference rules of Lc, together with the
following reduction axioms:
PEA1: [⊕pi]p↔ p for all p ∈ P
PEA2: [⊕pi]¬χ↔ ¬[⊕pi]χ
PEA3: [⊕pi](χ ∧ χ′)↔ [⊕pi]χ ∧ [⊕pi]χ′
PEA4: [⊕pi]0χ↔ 0[⊕pi]ϕ ∨
(
[+pi]χ ∧
∨
1≤i≤n(
∧
s∈S0(Ii)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕pi]χ)))
)
PEA5: [⊕pi]ρχ↔ piρχ, for ρ ∈ S0(Π∗)
PEA6: [⊕pi]∀χ↔ ∀[⊕pi]χ
where piρ denotes the concatenation of the sequences pi and ρ.
Theorem 5 L⊕c is sound and complete with respect to REL models.
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4 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented evidence logics that use a novel representation for evidence and incorporate
reliability-sensitive forms of evidence aggregation. Clearly, many open problems remain. Here are
a few more specific avenues for future research:
– Additional aggregators : We studied two natural aggregators. As we know from the social
choice literature, many other aggregators have nice properties. An interesting extension to
this work could involve developing logics based on other well-known aggregators.
– Additional evidential actions : As we saw, in a setting with ordered evidence, evidence actions
are complex transformations, both of the stock of evidence and the priority order. For the
lexicographic case, we studied a form of prioritized addition. It could be interesting to consider
more general forms of addition, or actions that transform the priority order (re-evaluation of
reliability) without affecting the stock of evidence.
– Probabilistic evidence: We moved from the binary evidence case to the relational evidence
case. Another important form of evidence is probabilistic evidence, i.e., evidence that comes
in the form of a probability distribution over the set of states. The aggregation of probability
functions is studied in probabilistic opinion pooling [9] and pure inductive logic [15], but a
dynamic-logic study has yet to be developed.
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PROOFS APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 2
Proposition 1 Let M = 〈W,E0, V 〉 be a feasible NEL model. For any ϕ ∈ L and any w ∈ W ,
we have: M,w |= ϕ iff Rel(M), w |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the structure of ϕ. The base case for ϕ = p (p ∈ P) and the inductive
step for ϕ = ¬ψ,ϕ = ψ ∧ χ and ϕ = ∀ψ are shown by unfolding the definitions. We show now
the cases involving 0 and  modalities.
– ϕ = 0ψ. Note that:
M,w |= 0ψ iff there is an e ∈ E0 such that w ∈ e ⊆ JψKM
iff there is an Re ∈ Rel(E0) such that Re[w] = e and e ⊆ JψKM
i.h.
iff there is an Re ∈ Rel(E0) such that Re[w] ⊆ JψKRel(M)
iff Rel(M), w |= 0ψ
– ϕ = ψ. Note that:
M,w |= ψ iff there is an e ∈ E such that w ∈ e ⊆ JψKM
iff there are e1, . . . , en ∈ E0 such that
n⋂
i=1
ei = e
and w ∈ e ⊆ JψKM
iff there are Re1 , . . . , Ren ∈ Rel(E0) such that Rei [w] = ei
and w ∈ e ⊆ JψKM
iff there are Re1 , . . . , Ren ∈ Rel(E0) such that (
n⋂
i=1
Rei)[w] ⊆ JψKM
iff (
⋂
R)[w] ⊆ (
n⋂
i=1
Rei)[w] ⊆ JψKM
i.h.
iff (
⋂
R)[w] ⊆ JψKRel(M)
iff Rel(M), w |= ψ
Proposition 2 Non-feasible NEL models need not be modally equivalent to their images under
Rel. In particular, the left-to-right direction of Proposition 1 holds for non-feasible evidence
models, but the right-to-left direction doesn’t: there are non-feasible neighborhood models M s.t.
Rel(M), w |= ψ but M,w 6|= ψ.
Proof. That the left-to-right direct holds is clear from the fact that the proofs for this direction
don’t depend on the cardinality of E0. For the right-to-left direction, the following is a counterex-
ample. Let M = 〈W,E0, V 〉, with W = N, E0 = {N\{2n+1} | n ∈ N} and V (p) = {2n | n ∈ N}.
Note that for all e ∈ E, e 6⊆ JpKM and thus M, 0 6|= p. Moreover, we have:
(
⋂
R∈Rel(E0)
R)[0] =
⋂
e∈E0
(Re[0])
And as 0 ∈ e for all e ∈ E0, by the fact that 0 ∈ e implies Re[0] = e, we have Re[0] = e for each
e ∈ E0. Hence ⋂
e∈E0
(Re[0]) =
⋂
e∈E0
(e) =
⋂
E0
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Note that
⋂
E0 = JpKM , and thus, (
⋂
R∈Rel(E0)
R)[0] = JpKM . We also have JpKM = JpKRel(M)
and hence (
⋂
R∈Rel(E0)
R)[0] = JpKRel(M) , which implies Rel(M), 0 |= p.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The following well-known results about relational composition will be used in the normal form
lemma.
Proposition 3 Relational composition distributes over arbitrary unions. That is, for any binary
relation R and any indexed family of binary relations Qi: (1) R ◦ (
⋃
iQi) =
⋃
i(R ∪ Qi); (2)
(
⋃
iQi) ◦R =
⋃
i(Qi ◦R).
Proof. See, e.g., [12, 8].
The following standard PDL facts will also be used.
Proposition 4 Let M be a REL model. Then:
1. (x, y) ∈ J?ϕ;A; ?ψKM iff x ∈ JϕKM and x ∈ JψKM .
2. (x, y) ∈ J?ϕ; ?ψKM iff (x, y) ∈ J?(ϕ ∧ ψ)KM .
3. (x, y) ∈ J?ϕ1;A; ?(ψ1 ∧ ϕ2);A; ?ψ2KM iff (x, y) ∈ J?(ϕ1 ∧ ∃(ψ1 ∧ ϕ2);A; ?ψ2KM
In the step of the normal form lemma concerning ∗-programs, we will make use of the following
definitions and results.
Definition 37 (Walks and paths). Let R ⊆ W × W . A walk along R is a sequence of
(not necessarily distinct) vertices w1, w2, . . . , wk, where wi ∈ W for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, such that
(vi, vi+1) ∈ R for i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. A path is a walk in which all vertices are distinct (except
possibly the first and last). A wv-walk is a walk with first vertex w and last vertex v. A wv-path
is defined similarly. The length of a walk (path) is its number of edges.
Proposition 5 Let R ⊆W ×W . Every wv-walk along R contains a wv-path along R.
Proof. This is a standard result. For a proof, see, e.g., [16, 19].
Proposition 6 Let M be a REL model. Every wv-path along J
⋃n
i=1(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)KM of length
ℓ > n contains a wv-path along J
⋃n
i=1(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)KM of length at most n.
Proof. Straightforward proof by induction on the length ℓ of a wv-path P = wu1u2 . . . uℓv.
Proposition 7 Let M be an REL model. Then Jπ∪?ϕK∗M = JπK
∗
M .
Proof. Straightforward.
After fixing the auxiliary results, we get to the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Normal Form Lemma) Given any program π ∈ Π, we can find a normal
form π′ for it. In particular, the normal form for program π∗, where π has a normal form⋃
i∈I(?ϕi;A; ?ψi) ∪ (?θ), is
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?(ϕs1 ∧
∧len(s)
k=2 (∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk)));A; ?ψslen(s))
)
∪ (?⊤).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of π. Let M be any REL model.
– π = A. Let π′ be the union form π′ := (?⊤;A; ?⊤)∪ (?⊥). It is straightforward to check that
π′ and π are equivalent.
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– π =?ϕ. Let π′ be the union form π′ := (?⊥;A; ?⊥) ∪ (?ϕ). Again, it is straightforward to
check that π′ and π are equivalent.
– π = π1 ∪π2. By induction hypothesis, we can find normal forms for π1 and π2. Let the forms
be π′1 :=
⋃
i∈I(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)∪?θ and π
′
2 :=
⋃
j∈J (?ϕj ;A; ?ψj)∪?θ
′ respectively. Let π′ be the
union form π′ := (
⋃
k∈I∪J?ϕk;A; ?ψk) ∪ (?θ ∨ θ
′). Again, it is straightforward to check that
π′ and π are equivalent.
– π = π1;π2. By induction hypothesis, we can find normal forms for π1 and π2. Let the forms be
π′1 :=
⋃
i∈I?(ϕi;A; ?ψi)∪?θ and π
′
2 :=
⋃
j∈J (?ϕj ;A; ?ψj)∪?θ
′ respectively. It is not difficult
to transform π into a normal form shape, essentially using (several times) the fact that
composition distributes over union (proposition 3) to pull the big unions to the left side of
the program, and re-indexing the formulas appropriately.
– π = π∗1 . By induction hypothesis, we can find a normal form for π1. Let this normal form be
π′1 :=
⋃
i∈I(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)∪?θ. We recall here that S0(I) denotes the set of all finite sequences
of elements from I, and len(s) denotes the length of sequence s = (s1, s2, . . . , slen(s)). Let π
′
be the union form:
π′ :=
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?(ϕs1 ∧
len(s)∧
k=2
(∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk )));A; ?ψslen(s))
)
∪ (?⊤)
We will show that π′ is a normal form for π. Observe that:
(x, y) ∈ Jπ∗1KM
iff (x, y) ∈ Jπ1K
∗
M
iff (x, y) ∈ J
⋃
i∈I
(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)∪?θK
∗
M
iff (x, y) ∈ J
⋃
i∈I
(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)K
∗
M (by proposition. 7)
iff there is an xy-walk along J
⋃
i∈I
(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)KM of length ℓ, or x = y
iff there is an xy-path along J
⋃
i∈I
(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)KM of length ℓ
′
, or x = y (by proposition. 5)
iff there is an xy-path along J
⋃
i∈I
(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)KM of length at most |I |, or x = y (by proposition. 6)
iff for some s ∈ S0(I), there are z1, z2, . . . , zlen(s), zlen(s)+1 such that z1 = x and zlen(s)+1 = y
and for each k ∈ {1, . . . , len(s)}, (zk, zk+1) ∈ J?ϕsk ;A; ?ψsk KM , or x = y
iff for some s ∈ S0(I), there are z1, z2, . . . , zlen(s), zlen(s)+1 such that z1 = x and zlen(s)+1 = y
and for each k ∈ {1, . . . , len(s)}, zk ∈ Jϕsk KM and zk+1 ∈ Jψsk KM and y ∈ Jψslen(s)KM
or x = y (by proposition. 4)
iff for some s ∈ S0(I), x ∈ Jϕs1 ∧
len(s)∧
k=2
(∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk ))KM and y ∈ Jψslen(s)KM , or x = y
iff for some s ∈ S0(I), (x, y) ∈ J?(ϕs1 ∧
len(s)∧
k=2
(∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk )));A; ?ψslen(s))KM
or x = y (by proposition. 4)
iff (x, y) ∈
⋃
s∈S0(I)
J?(ϕs1 ∧
len(s)∧
k=2
(∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk )));A; ?ψslen(s))KM , or x = y
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iff (x, y) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
?
(
(ϕs1 ∧
len(s)∧
k=2
(∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk)));A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM , or x = y
iff (x, y) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
?
(
(ϕs1 ∧
len(s)∧
k=2
(∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk)));A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM , or (x, y) ∈ J?⊤KM
iff (x, y) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?(ϕs1 ∧
len(s)∧
k=2
(∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk )));A; ?ψslen(s))
)
∪ (?⊤)KM
iff (x, y) ∈ Jπ′KM
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We recall the theorem:
Theorem 1 L∩ and Llex are sound and strongly complete with respect to ∩-models and lex-
models, respectively.
We prove the soundness and completeness of L∩ and Llex separately.
Soundness and completeness of L∩. The soundness proof is straightforward; it suffices to
check that each axiom is valid and that the inference rules preserve truth. We focus on the
completeness proof. The completeness of L w.r.t ∩-models follows from Proposition 1 and the
fact that L is complete, and has the finite model property, w.r.t NEL models (a result from [2]).
We recall Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Let M = 〈W,E0, V 〉 be a feasible NEL model. For any ϕ ∈ L and any w ∈ W ,
we have: M,w |= ϕ iff Rel(M), w |= ϕ.
Next, we recall a result proven in [2]:
Theorem 6, [2]. L is sound, strongly complete and has the finite model property with respect
to the class of NEL models.
The theorem above, together with the fact that feasible NEL models are modally equivalent
to their images under Rel, gives us the completeness of L w.r.t ∩-models.
Claim. L is complete w.r.t ∩-models.
Proof. As indicated, e.g., in [6, 194-195], a logic Λ is strongly complete with respect to a class of
models iff every Λ-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on some model in this class. Hence, it
suffices to show that every L-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on some ∩-model. Let Γ be
an L-consistent set of formulas. As L is complete and has the finite model property with respect
to NEL models, there is a finite (and hence feasible) NEL model M and a state w in M such that
M,w |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ . By proposition 1, we have Rel(M), w |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ . Thus, Γ is
satisfiable on a ∩-model.
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Soundness and completeness of Llex. The soundness proof is straightforward; we focus on
completeness. The approach to the proof is similar to the one used by Fagin et. al. [10] to prove
completeness for the logic of distributed knowledge. Before going into the details of the proof,
we give an outline of the main steps in it.
1. Step 1: Completeness of Llex with respect to pre-models. First, we define a specific type of
canonical REL model for each Llex-consistent theory T0, which we call a pre-model for T0.
Then we prove completeness of Llex via canonical pre-models.
2. Step 2: Unraveling. In the second step, we unravel the canonical pre-model for T0 (see Chapter
4.5 in [6] for details about this technique). This involves creating all possible histories in the
pre-model rooted at T0. The histories are the paths of the canonical pre-model that start at
T0. These histories are related in such a way that they form a tree.
3. Step 3: Completeness of Llex with respect to lex models. In the third step, we take the tree we
just constructed, and from we define a lex model for T0. Then we define a variant of a bounded
morphism between the canonical pre-model and the lex model generated from the tree, which
makes completeness with respect to those models immediate.
Step 1: Completeness with respect to pre-models. We build a canonical pre-model for
each Llex-consistent set of formulas T0. We first fix a standard lemma.
Lemma 1 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma). Every consistent set of formulas of L can be extended
to a maximally consistent one.
Proof. The proof is a special case of [6, 197].
We recall some properties of maximally consistent sets:
Proposition 1. Let T0 be a maximally consistent set. The following hold:
1. For any formula ϕ: ϕ ∈ T0 or ¬ϕ ∈ T0.
2. ϕ ∈ T0 iff T0 ⊢Llex ϕ.
3. T0 is closed under modus ponens: ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ∈ T0 implies ψ ∈ T0.
4. ¬ϕ ∈ T0 iff ϕ 6∈ T0.
5. ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ T0 iff ϕ ∈ T0 and ψ ∈ T0.
Proof. The proofs are all standard. See, e.g., [7, 53].
We now define the notion of a canonical pre-model that we will use in the completeness proof
of Step 1.
Definition 38 (Canonical pre-model for T0). Let T0 be a Llex-consistent set of formulas. A
canonical pre-model for T0 is a structure M
c = 〈W c, 〈Rc,c〉, V c, Agc〉 with:
– W c := {T | T is a maximally consistent theory and R∀T0T}.
– Rc := {R0ϕ | ϕ ∈ L and (∃0ϕ) ∈ T0} ∪ {R
′}.
– c is the reflexive closure of {(R,R′) | R ∈ R}.
– V c is a valuation function given by V c(p) := ‖p‖.
– Agc is an aggregator for W c given by
Ag
c(〈R,〉) =
{
R if 〈R,〉 = 〈Rc,c〉
W c ×W c otherwise
Where:
– R∀ ⊆W c ×W c is given by: R∀TS iff for all ϕ ∈ L : (∀ϕ) ∈ T ⇒ (∀ϕ) ∈ S.
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– for each ϕ ∈ L , R0ϕ ⊆ W c ×W c is given by: R0ϕTS iff 0ϕ ∈ T ⇒ 0ϕ ∈ S.
– R ⊆W c ×W c is given by: RTS iff for all ϕ ∈ L : ϕ ∈ T ⇒ ϕ ∈ S.
– F : W c ×L →W c is a function given by cases:
(a) for every pair (T, ϕ) such that (0ϕ) 6∈ T , choose some theory S ∈ W
c such that ϕ 6∈ S, and
put F (T, ϕ) := S;
(b) for every pair (T, ϕ) not satisfying the condition of case (a), put F (T, ϕ) := T .
– R′ := (R ∪ {(T, F (T, ϕ)) | T ∈W c and ϕ ∈ L })∗
– for each ϕ ∈ L , ‖ϕ‖c := {T ∈W
c | ϕ ∈ T}
We first need to show that this canonical pre-model is indeed a REL model.
Proposition 2. M c is a REL model.
Proof. In order to show that M c is an REL model, we have to show that:
1. Rc is a family of evidence, i.e., every R ∈ R is a preorder.
2. W c ×W c ∈ Rc.
3. R is a preorder, and thus Agc is well-defined.
For item 1, let ϕ ∈ L be arbitrary. Let R ∈ R be arbitrary. Then either R = R′ or R = R0ϕ
for some ϕ. As R′ is the reflexive transitive closure of the relation R ∪ {(T, F (T, ϕ)) | T ∈
W c and ϕ ∈ L }, it is a preorder, as required. Now consider R = R0ϕ for some ϕ. The reflexivity
of R is immediate from the definition of R0ϕ. For the transitivity, let T, S, U ∈M c and suppose
that R0ϕTS and R0ϕSU . Either 0ϕ 6∈ T or 0ϕ ∈ T . Note that, by definition of R0ϕ, if
0ϕ 6∈ T , then R0ϕ[T ] =W c and thus R0ϕTU . Suppose now that 0ϕ ∈ T . Then by definition
of R0ϕ, given R0ϕTS we have 0ϕ ∈ S, and thus as R0ϕSU we get 0ϕ ∈ U , which implies
R0ϕTU . For item 2, observe that N, i.e., 0⊤, is an axiom of our system. Thus it is a member
of any maximal consistent set, which implies that R0⊤ = W c ×W c. Now we consider item 3.
For reflexivity, suppose that (ϕ) ∈ T for some T ∈M c. As T is an axiom and T is maximal
consistent, (ϕ → ϕ) ∈ T . As (ϕ) ∈ T and T is closed under modus ponens, we have ϕ ∈ T .
Thus RTT . For transitivity, let T, S, U ∈ M c and suppose that RTS and RSU . Suppose
(ϕ) ∈ T . As 4 is an axiom and T is maximally consistent, (ϕ→ ϕ) ∈ T . As (ϕ) ∈ T
and T is closed under modus ponens, we have ϕ ∈ T . As RTS, we then have ϕ ∈ S.
Hence, as RSU , we have ϕ ∈ U . As ϕ was arbitrary, this holds for each ϕ and hence we have
RTU .
Having established that M c is a REL model, we prove now the standard lemmas to show that
the canonical pre-model works as expected.
Lemma 2 (Existence Lemma for ∀). ‖∃ϕ‖ 6= ∅ iff ‖ϕ‖ 6= ∅.
Proof. (⇒). Assume T ∈ ‖∃ϕ‖, i.e., (∃ϕ) ∈ T ∈W c. We first prove the following:
Claim. The set Γ := {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T } ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that Γ is inconsistent, i.e., Γ ⊢Llex ⊥. Then there are finitely many sentences
∀ψ1, . . . , ∀ψn ∈ T such that ⊢Llex ∀ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψn → ¬ϕ. By Necessitation for ∀ we have ⊢Llex
∀(∀ψ ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψn → ¬ϕ) and from this, by K∀ and modus ponens we get ⊢Llex ∀(∀ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧
∀ψn) → ∀¬ϕ. The system S5 has the theorem ⊢Llex (∀∀ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀∀ψn) → ∀(∀ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψn)
(see, e.g., [7, 20]). Hence by propositional logic we have ⊢Llex (∀∀ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀∀ψn) → ∀¬ϕ.
Given 4∀ we have ⊢Llex ∀ψ1 → ∀∀ψ1, . . . ,⊢Llex ∀ψn → ∀∀ψn, which by propositional logic implies
⊢Llex (∀ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψn)→ ∀∀ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀∀ψn. Thus we have ⊢Llex (∀ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψn)→ ∀¬ϕ. Hence
as T is maximal consistent and closed under modus ponens, we get (∀¬ϕ) ∈ T . But we also have
(∃ϕ) ∈ T , i.e., (¬∀¬ϕ) ∈ T , and since T is maximal consistent, this means that (∀¬ϕ) 6∈ T .
Contradiction.
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Given the Claim, by Lindenbaum’s Lemma, there is some maximally consistent theory S such
that Γ ⊆ S. As ϕ ∈ Γ we have ϕ ∈ S. Moreover, as {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T } ⊆ {∀χ | (∀χ) ∈ S} we have
R∀TS. As T ∈ W c, we also have R∀T0T . That is, {∀θ | (∀θ) ∈ T0} ⊆ {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T }. Thus
{∀θ | (∀θ) ∈ T0} ⊆ {∀χ | (∀χ) ∈ S} and thus R∀T0S. Hence S ∈ W c, which together with ϕ ∈ S
gives us S ∈ ‖ϕ‖.
(⇐) Assume T ∈ ‖ϕ‖, i.e., ϕ ∈ T . Given T∀ we have ⊢Llex ∀¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ, and by contraposition
we get ⊢Llex ¬¬ϕ → ¬∀¬ϕ, i.e., ⊢Llex ϕ → ∃ϕ. Hence (ϕ → ∃ϕ) ∈ T and as T is closed under
modus ponens, given also ϕ ∈ T we get (∃ϕ) ∈ T , i.e., T ∈ ‖∃ϕ‖.
Lemma 3 (Existence Lemma for ). T ∈ ‖♦ϕ‖ iff there is an S ∈ ‖ϕ‖ such that RTS.
Proof. (⇒). Assume T ∈ ‖♦ϕ‖, i.e., ♦ϕ ∈ T ∈ W c. We first prove the following:
Claim. The set Γ := {ψ | (ψ) ∈ T } ∪ {∀θ | ∀θ ∈ T0} ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that Γ is inconsistent. Then there is a finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ0 ⊢Llex ⊥. By
the theorems ⊢Llex (ψi1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψin) ↔ (ψi1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψin) and ⊢Llex ∀(θj1 ∧ · · · ∧ θjn) ↔
(∀θj1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀θjn) we can assume that Γ0 = {ψ, ∀θ,¬ϕ} for some ψ, ∀θ ∈ T . That is, we
have ⊢Llex ψ ∧ ∀θ → ¬ϕ. By Necessitation for  we obtain ⊢Llex (ψ ∧ ∀θ → ¬ϕ). From this,
by K we get ⊢Llex (ψ ∧ ∀θ) → ¬ϕ. By the theorem ⊢Llex (ψ ∧ ∀θ) ↔ (ψ ∧ ∀θ),
from propositional logic we get ⊢Llex (ψ ∧ ∀θ) → ¬ϕ. Given the axioms in our system we
have ⊢Llex ψ → ψ and ⊢Llex ∀(∀θ) → (∀θ). Using these, by propositional logic we obtain
⊢Llex (ψ∧∀∀θ)→ ¬ϕ. Given our axioms, we also have ⊢Llex ∀θ → ∀∀θ. Hence by propositional
logic we get ⊢Llex (ψ ∧∀θ)→ ¬ϕ. As ψ, ∀θ ∈ T and T is closed under modus ponens, we get
(¬ϕ) ∈ T . But we also have (♦ϕ) ∈ T , i.e., (¬¬ϕ) ∈ T , and since T is maximal consistent,
this means that (¬ϕ) 6∈ T . Contradiction.
Given the Claim, by Lindenbaum’s Lemma, there is some maximally consistent theory S such
that Γ ⊆ S. As ϕ ∈ Γ we have ϕ ∈ S. Moreover, as {ψ | (ψ) ∈ T } ⊆ S, we have RTS.
Additionally, we have {∀θ | (∀θ) ∈ T0} ⊆ S and thus R∀T0S. Hence S ∈W c, which together with
ϕ ∈ S gives us S ∈ ‖ϕ‖.
(⇐) Assume T ∈ ‖ϕ‖, i.e., ϕ ∈ T . Given T we have ⊢Llex ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ, and by contraposition
we get ⊢Llex ¬¬ϕ → ¬¬ϕ, i.e., ⊢Llex ϕ → ♦ϕ. Hence, (ϕ → ♦ϕ) ∈ T and as T is closed under
modus ponens, given also ϕ ∈ T we get (♦ϕ) ∈ T , i.e., T ∈ ‖♦ϕ‖.
Lemma 4 (Existence Lemma for 0). T ∈ ‖0ϕ‖ iff there is an R ∈ Rc such that R[T ] ⊆
‖ϕ‖.
Proof. (⇒). Assume T ∈ ‖0ϕ‖, i.e., (0ϕ) ∈ T ∈W c. We first prove the following:
Claim. ∃0ϕ ∈ T0.
Proof. Suppose not. As T0 is maximal consistent, we have ¬∃0ϕ ∈ T0, i.e., ∀¬0ϕ ∈ T0.
As T ∈ W c, we have R∀T0T . So given ∀¬0ϕ ∈ T0 we have ∀¬0ϕ ∈ T . By T∀ we have
⊢Llex ∀¬0ϕ → ¬0ϕ, i.e., (∀¬0ϕ → ¬0ϕ) ∈ T . As T is closed under modus ponens, given
(∀¬0ϕ) ∈ T we get (¬0ϕ) ∈ T . But we also have (0ϕ) ∈ T ∈W c and thus T is inconsistent.
Contradiction.
Hence R0ϕ ∈ Rc. We will show that R0ϕ[T ] ⊆ ‖ϕ‖. Let S ∈ W c be arbitrary and suppose
that R0ϕTS. By definition of R0ϕ, we have (0ϕ) ∈ T implies (0ϕ) ∈ S. As (0ϕ) ∈ T we
get (0ϕ) ∈ S. Given T0 we have ⊢Llex 0ϕ → ϕ and thus (0ϕ → ϕ) ∈ S. Since S is closed
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under modus ponens we thus get ϕ ∈ S, i.e., S ∈ ‖ϕ‖. As S was picked arbitrarily, we have
R0ϕ[T ] ⊆ ‖ϕ‖.
(⇐) Let T ∈ W c and suppose there is an R ∈ Rc such that R[T ] ⊆ ‖ϕ‖. By definition of Rc,
(i) R = R′ or (ii) R = R0θ for some θ ∈ L such that (∃0θ) ∈ T0.
We first consider the case (i), i.e., R = R′. We need to show that T ∈ ‖0ϕ‖. Suppose not,
i.e., 0ϕ 6∈ T . Recall that, given the definition of F : W c × L → W c, given that (0ϕ) 6∈ T ,
we have F (T, ϕ) = S for some theory S ∈ W c such that ϕ 6∈ S. Moreover, R′ is the re-
flexive transitive closure of the relation R ∪ {(T, F (T, ϕ)) | T ∈ W c and ϕ ∈ L }. Hence
(T, S) ∈ {(T, F (T, ϕ)) | T ∈ W c and ϕ ∈ L } and thus (T, S) ∈ R′. But then, as S ∈ W c and
ϕ 6∈ S, we have S 6∈ ‖ϕ‖. This implies R′[T ] 6⊆ ‖ϕ‖, contradicting our assumption to the contrary.
We now consider case (ii), i.e., R = R0θ for some θ ∈ L such that (∃0θ) ∈ T0. Either
0θ ∈ T or 0θ 6∈ T . We consider both cases.
Case 1: Suppose that 0θ ∈ T ∈ W c. We first prove the following:
Claim. The set Γ := {0θ} ∪ {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T } ∪ {¬ϕ} is inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose that Γ is consistent. By Lindenbaum’s Lemma there is some maximal consistent
theory S such that Γ ⊆ S. Moreover, as {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T0} ⊆ {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T } ⊆ S, we have
R∀T0S and thus S ∈ W c. As ¬ϕ ∈ Γ we have ¬ϕ ∈ S. Since S is consistent we have ϕ 6∈ S, i.e.,
S 6∈ ‖ϕ‖. From 0θ ∈ Γ we have 0θ ∈ S. By definition of R0θ, we get R0θTS. But then,
given S 6∈ ‖ϕ‖, we have R0θ[T ] 6⊆ ‖ϕ‖. Contradiction.
Given the Claim, there is a finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ0 ⊢Llex ⊥. By the theorem ⊢Llex ∀(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧
ψn)↔ (∀ψ1∧· · ·∧∀ψn) we can assume that Γ0 = {0θ, ∀ψ,¬ϕ} for some ψ ∈ T . Since Γ0 ⊢Llex ⊥
we have ⊢Llex (0θ ∧ ∀ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) → ⊥, so by propositional logic ⊢Llex (0θ ∧ ∀ψ) → (¬ϕ → ⊥),
i.e., ⊢Llex (0θ ∧ ∀ψ) → (¬¬ϕ), i.e., ⊢Llex (0θ ∧ ∀ψ) → ϕ. Given the Pullout axiom, we have
⊢Llex 0(θ ∧∀ψ)→ (0θ ∧ ∀ψ) and thus ⊢Llex 0(θ ∧∀ψ)→ ϕ. By the Monotonicity Rule for 0,
we get ⊢Llex 00(θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0ϕ. By 40 , we have ⊢Llex 0(θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 00(θ ∧ ∀ψ) and thus
⊢Llex 0(θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0ϕ. By the Pullout axiom, we have ⊢Llex (0θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0(θ ∧ ∀ψ). Hence
⊢Llex (0θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0ϕ. Therefore ((0θ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0ϕ) ∈ T . As (0θ) ∈ T and (∀ψ) ∈ T , by
closure under modus ponens, we have 0ϕ ∈ T . That is, T ∈ ‖0ϕ‖.
Case 2: Suppose that 0θ 6∈ T . Note that 0θ 6∈ T implies that R0θ[T ] =W c, and since we have
R = R0θ and R[T ] ⊆ ‖ϕ‖, all this gives us that W c ⊆ ‖ϕ‖c, i.e. all theories in the canonical
model contain ϕ. We now prove the following:
Claim. The set Γ := {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T } ∪ {¬ϕ} is inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose that Γ is consistent. By Lindenbaum’s Lemma there is some maximal consistent
theory S such that Γ ⊆ S. Moreover, as {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T0} ⊆ {∀ψ | (∀ψ) ∈ T } ⊆ S, we have
R∀T0S and thus S ∈W
c. As ¬ϕ ∈ Γ we have ¬ϕ ∈ S and thus S ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖. Therefore W c 6⊆ ‖ϕ‖
(contradiction).
Given the Claim, there is a finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ0 ⊢Llex ⊥. By the theorem ⊢Llex ∀(ψ1 ∧
· · · ∧ ψn) ↔ (∀ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀ψn) we can assume that Γ0 = {∀ψ,¬ϕ} for some ψ ∈ T . Since
Γ0 ⊢Llex ⊥ we have ⊢Llex (∀ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) → ⊥, so by propositional logic ⊢Llex (∀ψ) → (¬ϕ → ⊥), i.e.,
⊢Llex (∀ψ) → (¬¬ϕ), i.e., ⊢Llex (∀ψ) → ϕ. By propositional logic, given ⊢Llex (∀ψ) → ϕ we can
strengthen the antecedent getting ⊢Llex (0⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → ϕ. Given the Pullout axiom
↔, we have
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⊢Llex 0(⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) ↔ (0⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) and thus ⊢Llex 0(⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → ϕ. By the Monotonicity Rule for
0, we get ⊢Llex 00(⊤∧ ∀ψ)→ 0ϕ. By 40 , we have ⊢Llex 0(⊤∧ ∀ψ)→ 00(⊤∧ ∀ψ) and
thus ⊢Llex 0(⊤∧∀ψ)→ 0ϕ. By the Pullout axiom
↔, we have ⊢Llex (0⊤∧∀ψ)↔ 0(⊤∧∀ψ).
Hence ⊢Llex (0⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0ϕ. Therefore ((0⊤ ∧ ∀ψ) → 0ϕ) ∈ T . As 0⊤ is an axiom of
our system, we have (0⊤) ∈ T and (∀ψ) ∈ T . Hence by closure under modus ponens, we have
0ϕ ∈ T . That is, T ∈ ‖0ϕ‖.
Lemma 5 (Truth Lemma). For every ϕ ∈ L , we have: JϕKMc = ‖ϕ‖.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case follows from the definition
of V c. For the inductive case, suppose that for all T ∈W c and all formulas ψ of lower complexity
than ϕ, we have JψKMc = ‖ψ‖. The Boolean cases where ϕ = ¬ψ and ϕ = ψ1∧ψ2 follow from the
induction hypothesis together with the standard facts about maximal consistent theories included
in proposition 1. Only the modalities remain. Let ϕ = ∃ψ and consider any T ∈ M c. We have
T ∈ ‖∃ψ‖ iff (proposition 2) ‖ϕ‖ 6= ∅ iff (induction hypothesis) JψKMc iff J∃ψKMc = W c iff
T ∈ J∃ψKMc . Now let ϕ = 0ψ and consider any T ∈M c. We have T ∈ ‖0ψ‖ iff (proposition
4) there is an R ∈ Rc such that R[T ] ⊆ ‖ψ‖ iff (induction hypothesis) there is an R ∈ Rc such
that R[T ] ⊆ JψKMc iff T ∈ J0ψKMc . Let ϕ = ♦ψ. We have T ∈ ‖♦ψ‖ iff (proposition 3) there is
an S ∈ ‖ψ‖ such that RTS iff (induction hypothesis) there is an S ∈ JψKMc such that RTS
iff there is an S ∈ JψKMc such that (T, S) ∈ Agc(〈Rc,c〉) iff T ∈ J♦ψKMc .
Lemma 6. Llex is strongly complete with respect to the class of pre-models (and hence it is also
complete with respect to REL models).
Proof. It suffices to show that every Llex-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on some lex
model. Let Γ be an Llex-consistent set of formulas. By Lindenbaums Lemma, there is a maximally
consistent set T0 such that Γ ⊆ T0. Choose any canonical pre-model M c for T0. By Lemma 5:
M c, T0 |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ T0.
4.1 Step 2: Unravelling the canonical pre-model
Next, we will unravel the canonical pre-model. We first fix some preliminary notions. First, define
a set of “evidential indices”
I := {0ϕ | (∃0ϕ) ∈ T0} ∪ {} ∪ {(ϕ, j) | ϕ ∈ L , j ∈ {l, r}},
where l is a symbol for “left” copy and r is a symbol for “right” copy. We use ǫ, ǫ′ as meta-
variables ranging over evidential indices in I. To each ǫ ∈ I, we associate a corresponding relation
Rǫ on the canonical model W c, as follows: R0ϕ and R are as before (the relations in the
canonical pre-model), and R(ϕ,l) = R(ϕ,r) := {(T, S) | S = F (T, ϕ)}.
Definition 39 (Histories). Let M c = 〈W c, 〈Rc,c〉, V c, Agc〉 be a canonical pre-model for T0.
The set of histories rooted at T0 is the following set of finite sequences:
W˜ := {(T0, ǫ1, T1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫn, Tn) | n ≥ 0, ǫi ∈ I and Ti−1R
ǫiTi for all i ≤ n}
The set W˜ forms the set of worlds of the unravelled tree.
Basically, histories record all finite sequences of worlds in M c starting with T0 and passing
to Rǫ-successors at each step, where ǫ ∈ I.
Definition 40 (β). We denote by β : W˜ → W c the map returning the last theory in each
history, i.e. β(T0, ǫ1, T1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫn, Tn) := Tn for all histories in W˜ .
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We now define the relations that will feature in the unravelling of M c around T0.
Definition 41 (→ǫ relations). For a history w = (T0, ǫ1, T1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫn, Tn) ∈ W˜ , we denote by
(w, ǫ, T ) := (T0, ǫ1, T1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫn, Tn, ǫ, T )
the history obtained by extending the history w with the sequence (ǫ, T ) (where T ∈ W c). Using
this notation, we define the following relations →ǫ over W˜ , labelled by indices in I:
w→ǫ w′ iff w′ = (w, ǫ, T ) for some T ∈ W c
We now define the unravelled tree for T0.
Definition 42 (Unravelled tree). Let M c = 〈W c, 〈Rc,c〉, V c, Agc〉 be a canonical pre-model
for T0. The unravelling of M
c around T0 is the structure K˜ = 〈W˜ , {→ǫ| ǫ ∈ I}, V˜ 〉 with
V˜ (p) := {w ∈ W˜ | β(w) ∈ V c(p)}
In the tree unravelling, one history has another history accessible if the second is one step
longer than the first. The valuation on histories is copied from that on their last nodes. We now
define paths on this tree of histories.
Definition 43 (R-path). Let w,w′ ∈ W˜ and let R ⊆ {→ǫ| ǫ ∈ I}. An R-path from w to w′ is
a finite sequence
p = (w0, ǫ1, w1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫn−1, wn)
where w0 = w, wn = w
′, wk ∈ W˜ for k = 1, 2, . . . , n, ǫk ∈ I for k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 and
wk →ǫk wk+1 for k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. For an R-path p = (w0, ǫ1, w1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫn−1, wn) from w to
w′, we denote by
(p, ǫ, w′′) := (w0, ǫ1, w1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫn−1, wn, ǫ, w
′′)
the path obtained by extending the path p with (ǫ, w′′). If R is not specified, we speak of a path.
For any path p = (w0, ǫ1, w1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫn−1, wn) we define first(p) = w0 and last(p) = wn.
The following is a standard results about (unravelled) trees, which we will refer to later on.
Lemma 7 (Uniqueness of paths). Let K˜ be the unravelling of M c around T0. Let w,w
′ ∈ W˜
and R ⊆ {→ǫ| ǫ ∈ I}. Then, there is at most one R-path p from w to w′.
4.2 Step 3: Completeness with respect to lex-models
Step 2 unravelled the canonical pre-model from step 1. Using the structure from the unravelled
tree, we now define a REL model M˜ from it. We then show that this model is in fact a lex-model.
Finally, we define a variant of a bounded morphism defined for RELmodels, which we call bounded
aggregation-morphism. Bounded aggregation-morphisms work on REL models in the same way
as standard bounded-morphisms do on Kripke models: for REL models, modal satisfaction is
invariant under bounded aggregation-morphisms. We then show that M c is a bounded-morphic
image of M˜ , which gives us completeness. We first define the model M˜ .
Definition 44 (M˜). Let K˜ be the unravelling of M c around T0. The structure M˜ =
〈W˜ , 〈R˜, ˜〉, V˜ , A˜g〉 has:
R˜ := {R˜0ϕ | (∃0ϕ) ∈ T0} ∪ {R
′
l, R
′
r} ∪ {W˜ × W˜}
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where:
R˜0ϕ := (→0ϕ)∗
R′l = (→
 ∪
⋃
{→(ϕ,l)| ϕ ∈ L })∗
R′r = (→
 ∪
⋃
{→(ϕ,r)| ϕ ∈ L })∗
Moreover, ˜ is the reflexive closure of {(R,Q) | R ∈ R˜, Q ∈ {R′l, R
′
r}} Finally, the aggregator
A˜g is given by:
A˜g(〈R,〉) =
{
R˜ := (→)∗ if 〈R,〉 = 〈R˜, ˜〉
lex(〈R,〉) otherwise
Proposition 3. All the evidence relations in R˜ \ {W˜ × W˜} are reflexive, transitive and anti-
symmetric.
Proof. Reflexivity and transitivity follow immediately from the fact that each R ∈ R˜ \ {W˜ × W˜}
is the reflexive transitive closure of some other relation, and W˜ × W˜ is reflexive and transitive.
Hence we just need to show the anti-symmetry of the relations. Let R ∈ R˜ \ {W˜ × W˜} and
suppose Rwv and Rvw. First, we consider the case R = R˜0ϕ for some ϕ such that ∃0ϕ ∈ T0.
I.e. R = (→0ϕ)∗. Given Rwv there is some n ≥ 0 such that:
w = w0 →
0ϕ w1 →
0ϕ · · · →0ϕ wn = v
Similarly, given Rvw there is some m ≥ 0 such that:
v = w′0 →
0ϕ w′1 →
0ϕ · · · →0ϕ w′m = w
By definition of→0ϕ, we have w1 = (w,0ϕ, T1) for some T1 ∈ W
c, w2 = (w,0ϕ, T1,0ϕ, T2)
for some T2 ∈W c, and proceeding in this way we get
wn = v = (w,0ϕ, T1,0ϕ, T2, . . . ,0ϕ, Tn) where Ti ∈ W
c, for i ≤ n (1)
Similarly, we have w′1 = (v,0ϕ, T
′
1) for some T
′
1 ∈W
c, w′2 = (v,0ϕ, T
′
1,0ϕ, T
′
2) for some
T ′2 ∈W
c, and proceeding in this way we get
w′m = w = (v,0ϕ, T
′
1,0ϕ, T
′
2, . . . ,0ϕ, T
′
n) where T
′
i ∈ W
c, for i ≤ m (2)
Hence we must have n = m = 0. For otherwise, substituting v in 2 with the expression in 1 we
get
w = (w,0ϕ, T1,0ϕ, T2, . . . ,0ϕ, Tn, v,0ϕ, T
′
1,0ϕ, T
′
2, . . . ,0ϕ, T
′
m) for n > 0 or m > 0
which is impossible. Therefore w = w0 = wn = v, as required.
Now we consider the case R = R′l, i.e. R = (→
 ∪
⋃
{→(ϕ,l)| ϕ ∈ L })∗. Given Rwv there is
some n ≥ 0 such that:
w = w0 →
i0 w1 →
i2 · · · →in−1 wn = v where ik ∈ {} ∪ {(ϕ, l) | ϕ ∈ L }, for k = 1, . . . , n− 1
Similarly, given Rvw there is some m ≥ 0 such that:
v = w′0 →
j0 w′1 →
j2 · · · →jm−1 w′n = v where jk ∈ {} ∪ {(ϕ, l) | ϕ ∈ L }, for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1
Reasoning as we did in the case of R = R˜0ϕ, we conclude that m = n = 0 and hence w = v.
The case of R = R′r is analogous to the one just discussed, and we are done.
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Proposition 4. In M˜ we have:
R′l ∩R
′
d = R˜

Proof.
(⊆) Let (w, v) ∈ R′l ∩R
′
d. Then we have (w, v) ∈ R
′
l, i.e.,
(w, v) ∈ (→ ∪
⋃
{→(ϕ,l)| ϕ ∈ L })∗
Hence, there is some n ≥ 0 such that:
w = w0 →
i0 w1 →
i2 · · · →in−1 wn = v where ik ∈ {} ∪ {(ϕ, l) | ϕ ∈ L }, for k = 1, . . . , n− 1
Similarly, we have (w, v) ∈ R′r, i.e.,
(w, v) ∈ (→ ∪
⋃
{→(ϕ,r)| ϕ ∈ L })∗
Hence, there is some m ≥ 0 such that:
w = w′0 →
j0 w′1 →
j2 · · · →jm−1 w′m = v where jk ∈ {}∪ {(ϕ, r) | ϕ ∈ L }, for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1
By definition of →ik , we have w1 = (w, i0, T1) for some T1 ∈ W c, w2 = (w, i0, T1, i1, T2) for
some T2 ∈ W c, and proceeding in this way we get
wn = v = (w, i0, T1, i1, T2, . . . , in−1, Tn) (3)
where Ti ∈ W
c and ik ∈ {} ∪ {(ϕ, l) | ϕ ∈ L }, for k = 1, . . . , n − 1. Reasoning in a similar
way, we get
w′m = v = (w, j0, T
′
1, j1, T
′
2, . . . , jm−1, T
′
m) (4)
where T ′i ∈ W
c and jk ∈ {} ∪ {(ϕ, r) | ϕ ∈ L }, for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Given the expressions 3 and 4, we have wn = v = w
′
m. Hence n = m and for all k < n,
ik = jk. Hence we must have ik =  = jk for all k < n. This means that the path
w = w0 →
i0 w1 →
i2 · · · →in−1 wn = v
can be rewritten as
w = w0 →
 w1 →
 · · · → wn = v
which is an {}-path from w to v. Hence (w, v) ∈ R˜ = (→)∗.
(⊇) Let (w, v) ∈ R˜ = (→)∗. Then there is some n ≥ 0 such that:
w = w0 →
 w1 →
 · · · → wn = v
The {}-path described above is also an {} ∪
⋃
{(ϕ, l) | ϕ ∈ L }-path and an {} ∪
⋃
{(ϕ, r) |
ϕ ∈ L }-path. Hence we have (w, v) ∈ R′l and (w, v) ∈ R
′
r. Thus (w, v) ∈ R
′
l ∩R
′
r.
Proposition 5. M˜ is a lex model.
Proof. To establish that M˜ is a lex model, we need to show that it meets the condition of a REL
model and that A˜g = lex. That is, we have to show:
1. R˜ is a family of evidence, i.e., every R ∈ R˜ is a preorder.
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2. W˜ × W˜ ∈ R˜, i.e., the trivial evidence order is a piece of available evidence.
3. R˜ = lex(〈R˜, ˜〉) (which given the definition of A˜g, gives A˜g = lex as required)
Item 1 follows from 3, and Item 2 follows from the definition of M˜ . Hence Item 3 remains to be
shown. Note first that by 4, we have R′l ∩R
′
d = R˜
.
(⊆) Suppose that (w, v) ∈ lex(〈R˜, ˜). Note that lex is given here by
(w, v) ∈ lex(〈R˜, ˜〉) iff ∀R′ ∈ R (R′wv ∨ ∃R ∈ R˜(R′≺˜R ∧R<wv)) (5)
Suppose for reductio that (w, v) 6∈ R′l ∩ R
′
d. Then (w, v) 6∈ R
′
l or (w, v) 6∈ R
′
r. Without loss of
generality, suppose (w, v) 6∈ R′l. Given 5, we have in particular:
(R′lwv ∨ ∃R ∈ R˜(R
′
l≺˜R ∧R
<wv)) (6)
Note that the definition of ˜ is such that R′l has no relation strictly above it other than W˜ × W˜ .
And W˜ ×W˜ is symmetric and thus it is not the case that (W˜ ×W˜ )<wv. Hence the right disjunct
in 6 is false. Therefore we must have R′lwv, contradicting our assumption to the contrary.
Suppose that (w, v) ∈ R′l∩R
′
d. Then R
′
lwv and R
′
rwv. Suppose first that w = v. As lex(〈R˜, ˜〉)
is a preorder, we have (w, v) ∈ lex(〈R˜, ˜〉) and we are done. Suppose now that w 6= v. By
proposition 3, R′l and R
′
r are antisymmetric. Thus from w 6= v, R
′
lwv and R
′
rwv, we get (R
′
l)
<wv
and (R′r)
<wv. Hence, as we have
R≺˜R′l, R
′
r for all R ∈ R˜ \ {R
′
l, R
′
r}
from the definition of lex we get (w, v) ∈ lex(〈R˜, ˜) as required.
We now introduce the notion of a bounded aggregation-morphism. This is, as we will show,
a truth-preserving map between REL models, which works similarly to standard bounded mor-
phisms for Kripke models.
Definition 45 (Bounded aggregation-morphism). Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 and M ′ =
〈W ′, 〈R′,′〉, V ′, Ag′〉 be two REL models. A mapping f : W → W ′ is a bounded aggregation-
morphism if the following hold:
1. Valuation condition: for all w ∈ W , w ∈ V (p) iff f(w) ∈ V ′(p)
2. Forth conditions:
(a) for all R ∈ R, for all w ∈ W , there exists some R′ ∈ R′ such that R′[f(w)] ⊆ {f(v) |
Rwv}
(b) for all w, v ∈ W , if Ag(〈R,〉)wv then Ag′(〈R′,′〉)f(w)f(v)
3. Back conditions:
(a) for all R′ ∈ R′ and all w ∈ W there exists some R ∈ R such that {f(v) | Rwv} ⊆
R′[f(w)].
(b) for all w ∈W , v′ ∈ W ′, if Ag′(〈R′,′〉)f(w)v′ then there exists some world v ∈W such
that Ag(〈R,〉)wv and f(v) = v′.
Proposition 6. Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 and M ′ = 〈W ′, 〈R′,′〉, V ′, Ag′〉 be two REL mod-
els. Let f : W → W ′ be a surjective bounded aggregation-morphism. Then for all w ∈ W and
ϕ ∈ L : M,w |= ϕ iff M ′, f(w) |= ϕ. That is: modal satisfaction is invariant under surjective
bounded aggregation-morphisms.
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Proof. By induction on the structure of ϕ. The base case holds by the valuation condition. The
boolean cases are shown by unfolding the definitions, so we consider the cases involving modalities.
Suppose M,w |= ♦0ψ. Then for all R ∈ R there is some v ∈ W such that Rwv and M, v |= ψ.
Now we want to show: M, f(w) |= ♦0ψ. That is, for all R′ ∈ R′ there is some v′ ∈ W ′ such
that R′f(w)v′ and M ′, v′ |= ψ. Let R′ ∈ R′ be arbitrary. By the back condition 3(a), there is
some R ∈ R such that {f(v) | Rwv} ⊆ R′[f(w)]. Hence given Rwv, we have f(v) ∈ R′[f(w)].
That is, R′f(w)f(v). By induction hypothesis, given M, v |= ψ we have M ′, f(v) |= ψ. As R′
was arbitrarily picked, this holds for all relations in R′. Hence M ′, f(w) |= ♦0ψ.
Suppose now that M ′, f(w) |= ♦0ψ. Then for all R′ ∈ R′ there is some v′ ∈ W ′ such that
R′f(w)v′ and M ′, v′ |= ψ. Now we want to show: M,w |= ♦0ψ. That is, for all R ∈ R there
is some v ∈ W such that Rwv and M, v |= ψ. Let R ∈ R be arbitrary. By the forth condition
2(a), there exists some R′ ∈ R′ such that R′[f(w)] ⊆ {f(v) | Rwv}. We have R′f(w)v′ and
M ′, v′ |= ψ for some v′ ∈ W ′. As f is surjective, we have v′ = f(u) for some u ∈ W . Hence
given R′[f(w)] ⊆ {f(v) | Rwv} and f(u) ∈ R′[f(w)], we get f(u) ∈ {f(v) | Rwv}. Hence Rwu.
By induction hypothesis, given M ′, f(u) |= ψ we get M,u |= ψ. As R was arbitrarily picked, this
holds for all relations in R. Hence we have M,w |= ⋄0ψ.
Now suppose M,w |= ♦ψ. Then there is some v ∈ W such that Ag(〉R, 〈)wv and
M, v |= ψ. By the forth condition 2(b), we have Ag′(〉R′,′ 〈)f(w)f(v). By induction hypothesis,
M ′, f(v) |= ψ. Hence M ′, f(w) |= ψ.
Lastly, suppose M, f(w) |= ♦ψ. Then there is some v′ ∈ W ′ such that Ag′(〉R′,′ 〈)wv and
M ′, v′ |= ψ. Hence by the back condition 3(b), there is some world v ∈ W such that Ag(〉R, 〈)wv
and f(v) = v′. By induction hypothesis, we get M, v |= ψ. Hence M,w |= ♦ψ.
Proposition 7. The map β : W˜ →W c is a surjective bounded aggregation-morphism.
Proof. We need to check that β satisfies the conditions of a surjective bounded aggregation-
morphism.
1. Surjectivity: Let T ∈ W c be arbitrary. We need to show that there is some h ∈ W˜ such that
β(h) = T . Recall that we showed in 2.2. that W c ×W c = R0⊤ ∈ R . Hence R0⊤T0T . Thus
the history h = (T0,0⊤, T ) is an element of W˜ with β(h) = T , as required.
2. Valuation condition. This follows from the definition of V˜ .
3. Forth conditions:
(a) We need to show that for all R ∈ R˜, for all w ∈ W˜ , there exists some R′′ ∈ Rc such
that R′′[β(w)] ⊆ {β(v) | Rwv}. Let R ∈ R˜ and w ∈ W˜ be arbitrary. Suppose first that
R = R˜0ϕ for some ϕ with ∃0ϕ ∈ T0. Consider R0ϕ ∈ Rc. Take any T ∈ R0ϕ[β(w)],
i.e., R0ϕβ(w)T . We will show that T ∈ {β(v) | R˜0ϕwv}. Note that, given R0ϕβ(w)T ,
the history w′ = (w,0ϕ, T ) is in W˜ . This means that w →0ϕ w′. Hence (→0ϕ)∗ww′,
i.e., R˜0ϕww′. Given β(w′) = T , we get T ∈ {β(v) | R˜0ϕwv}, as required.
Suppose now that R = R′l = (→
 ∪
⋃
{→(ϕ,l)| ϕ ∈ L })∗. Consider R′ = (R ∪⋃
{R(ϕ,l)})∗ ∈ Rc. Take any T ∈ R′[β(w)], i.e., R′β(w)T . We will show that T ∈ {β(v) |
R′lwv}. Given R
′β(w)T , for some n ≥ 0, there is a path:
β(w) = S0R
ǫ0S1R
ǫ2 , . . . , Rǫn−1Sn = T
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where Si ∈ W c, ǫk ∈ {} ∪ {(ϕ, l) | ϕ ∈ L }, for k < n. Hence there are histories
w1 = (w, ǫ0, S1), w2 = (w, ǫ0, S1, ǫ1, S2), up to wn = (w, ǫ0, S1, ǫ1, S2, . . . , ǫn−1, T ). Hence,
by definition of →ǫk , for each k < n, we have wk →ǫk wk+1. Hence there is a path
w = w0 →
ǫ0 w1 →
ǫ2 , . . . ,→ǫn−1 wn
And hence R′lwwn. Given β(wn) = T , we get T ∈ {β(v) | R
′
lwv}, as required.
The case of R = R′r is analogous to the one above. Hence we have left the case R = W˜×W˜ .
Consider R0⊤ = W c×W c ∈ Rc. Take any T ∈ R0⊤[β(w)], i.e., R0⊤β(w)T . This just
means that T ∈ W c. We will show that T ∈ {β(v) | (w, v) ∈ W˜ × W˜} = {β(v) | v ∈ W˜}.
As β is surjective, we know that there is some u ∈ W˜ such that β(u) = T , and we are
done.
(b) We need to show that for all w, v ∈ W˜ , if A˜g(〈R˜, ˜〉)wv then Agc(〈Rc,c〉)β(w)β(v).
Let w, v ∈ W˜ be arbitrary and suppose that A˜g(〈R˜, ˜〉)wv. By proposition 5.3, given
A˜g(〈R˜, ˜〉)wv we have R˜wv, i.e., (→)∗wv. Hence, for some n ≥ 0, there is a path:
w = w0 →
 w1 →
 · · · → wn = v
Hence there are histories w1 = (w,, S1), w2 = (w,, S1,, S2), up to wn = v =
(w,, S1,, S2, . . . ,, Sn). Hence by definition of wn we have
β(w)RS1R
S2, . . . , R
Sn
And since R is transitive, we get Rβ(w)Sn, i.e., R
β(w)β(v), as required.
4. Back conditions:
(a) We need to show that for all R′′ ∈ Rc and all w ∈ W˜ there exists some R ∈ R˜ such
that {β(v) | Rwv} ⊆ R′′[β(w)]. Let R′′ ∈ Rc and w ∈ W˜ be arbitrary. We reason by
cases. First, suppose that R′′ = R0ϕ. Consider R˜0ϕ ∈ R˜. We will show that {β(v) |
R˜0ϕwv} ⊆ R0ϕ[β(w)]. Take any β(u) ∈ {β(v) | R˜0ϕwv}. We have R˜0ϕwu, i.e.,
(→0ϕ)∗wu. Hence for some n ≥ 0, there is a path:
w = w0 →
0ϕ w1 →
0ϕ, . . . ,→0ϕ wn = u
where wi ∈ W˜ , for k ≤ n. Hence there are histories w1 = (w,0ϕ, S1), w2 =
(w,0ϕ, S1,0ϕ, S2), up to wn = u = (w,0ϕ, S1,0ϕ, S2, . . . ,0ϕ, Sn). Hence, by def-
inition of wn, we have
β(w)R0S1R
0 , . . . , R0β(u)
And since R0 is transitive, we get R0β(w)β(u), as required.
Suppose now that R′′ = R′ ∈ W c. Consider R′l ∈ R˜. We will show that {β(v) | R
′
lwv} ⊆
R′[β(w)]. Take any β(u) ∈ {β(v) | R′lwv}. We have R
′
lwu, i.e., (→
 ∪
⋃
{→(ϕ,l)| ϕ ∈
L })∗wu. Hence for some n ≥ 0, there is a path:
w = w0 →
ǫ0 w1 →
ǫ1 , . . . ,→ǫn−1 wn = u
where wi ∈ W˜ , ǫk ∈ {} ∪
⋃
{(ϕ, l) | ϕ ∈ L } for k < n. By definition of →ǫk , w1 =
(w, ǫ0, S1) for some S1 ∈ W
c, w2 = (w, ǫ0, S1, ǫ1ϕ, S2) for some S2 ∈ W
c, up to wn =
u = (w, ǫ0, S1, ǫ1, S2, . . . , ǫn−1, Sn) where Si ∈ W c for i ≤ n. Hence, by definition of wn,
we have a path
β(w)Rǫ0S1R
ǫ1S2, . . . , R
ǫn−1β(u)
Since R′ = (R ∪
⋃
{R(ϕ,l)})∗, the path above is a path from β(w) to β(u) along R′, i.e.,
we have R′β(w)β(u), as required.
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(b) We need to show that for all w ∈ W˜ , T ∈ W c, if Agc(〈Rc,c〉)β(w)T then there exists
some history v ∈ W˜ such that A˜g(〈R˜, ˜〉)wv and β(v) = T . Let w ∈ W˜ and T ∈ W c
be arbitrary, and suppose that Agc(〈Rc,c〉)β(w)T , i.e., Rβ(w)T . Then the history
w′ = (w,, T ) is in W˜ and β(w′) = T , as required.
With the results established above, we can now show the main result.
Claim. Llex is complete w.r.t. lex models.
Proof. Let Γ be a Llex-consistent set of formulas. By Lindenbaum’s Lemma, Γ can be extended
to a maximal consistent set T0. Choose any canonical pre-model M
c for T0. By Lemma 14,
M c, T0 |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ T0. Let K˜ be the unraveling of M c around T0 and let M˜ be the lex model
generated from K˜. Note that the history (T0) ∈ W˜ . Let β : W˜ →W c be the map defined above.
By proposition 7, β is a surjective bounded aggregation-morphism. By proposition 6, we have
M c, T0 |= ψ iff M˜, β(T0) |= ψ. Hence, in particular, M˜, β(T0) |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ T0.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We recall the theorem:
Theorem 2 L!, L+ and L⇑ are sound and complete with respect to ∩-models.
We prove the soundness and completeness of L!, L+ and L⇑ separately.
Soundness and completeness of L!.
Claim. L! is sound w.r.t. ∩-models.
Proof. A straighforward validity check.
Claim. L! is complete w.r.t ∩-models.
Proof. The proof is standard, following the approach presented, e.g., in [21], Chapter 7.
Soundness and completeness of L+. As before, we first consider soundness.
Claim. L+ is sound w.r.t ∩-models.
Proof. Let M = 〈W,R, V, Ag∩〉 be a ∩-model, w a world in M , π be an evidence program with
normal form
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)) ∪ (?⊤).
1. Axiom EA4∩: We first prove the following:
Claim. JπKM [w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM iff M,w |= [+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [+π]χ)).
Proof. (⇒) Suppose JπKM [w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM . As π is a ∗-program, JπKM is reflexive and thus
M,w |= [+π]χ. It remains to be shown that
M,w |=
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [+π]χ))
Take any s ∈ S0(I) and suppose that M,w |= s(ϕ,ψ). We need to show that M,w |=
∀(ψslen(s) → [+π]χ). Take any v ∈ W and suppose M, v |= ψslen(s) . If we show that M, v |=
32
[+π]χ, we are done. Given M,w |= s(ϕ,ψ) and M, v |= ψslen(s) , by Proposition 4, we have
(w, v) ∈ J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM . Thus
(w, v) ∈
⋃
s∈S0(I)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM
Hence as
JπKM = J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤)KM
= J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM ∪ J?⊤KM
=
⋃
s∈S0(I)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM ∪ J?⊤KM
we have (w, v) ∈ JπKM . Hence, given JπKM [w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM we have M, v |= [+π]χ, as
required.
(⇐) Suppose that M,w |= [+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ) → ∀(ψslen(s) → [+π]χ)). We will show
that JπKM [w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM . Take any v and suppose (w, v) ∈ JπKM . We need to show that
v ∈ J[+π]χKM . If v = w, given M,w |= [+π]χ we are done. So suppose v 6= w. Note that
(w, v) ∈ JπKM
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
?
(
s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤)KM
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM or (w, v) ∈ J?⊤KM
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM or w = v
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM (as w 6= v by assumption )
iff (w, v) ∈
⋃
s∈S0(I)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM
iff for some s′ ∈ S0(I), (w, v) ∈ J?s
′(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψs′
len(s′)
KM
iff for some s′ ∈ S0(I), w ∈ Js
′(ϕ,ψ)KM and v ∈ Jψs′
len(s′)
KM (by Proposition 4)
Since we have M,w |=
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [+π]χ)), we get in particular
M,w |= s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→ [+π]χ)
Thus from w ∈ Js′(ϕ,ψ)KM we get M,w |= ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→ [+π]χ). And given v ∈ Jψs′
len(s′)
KM
we get M, v |= [+π]χ, as required.
Given the Claim, we have:
M,w |= [+π]0χ
iff M+π, w |= 0χ
iff there is an R ∈ R ∪ {JπKM} such that R[w] ⊆ JχKM+π
iff there is an R ∈ R ∪ {JπKM} such that R[w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM
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iff there is an R ∈ R such that R[w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM
or JπKM [w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM
iff M,w |= 0[+π]χ
or M,w |= [+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [+π]χ)) ( by the Claim above))
iff M,w |= 0[+π]χ ∨
(
[+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(Ii)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [+〈πi〉i<n]χ))
)
2. Axiom EA5∩: We first prove the following:
Claim.
⋂
(R ∪ {JπKM})[w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM iff M,w |= [+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) →
[+π]χ)).
Proof. (⇒) Suppose
⋂
(R∪{JπKM})[w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM . As
⋂
(R∪{JπKM}) is reflexive, we have
M,w |= [+π]χ. It remains to be shown that
M,w |=
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) → [+π]χ))
Take any s ∈ S0(I) and suppose that M,w |= s(ϕ,ψ). We need to show that M,w |=
(ψslen(s) → [+π]χ). Take any v ∈
⋂
(R)[w] and suppose M, v |= ψslen(s) . If we show that
M, v |= [+π]χ, we are done. Given M,w |= s(ϕ,ψ) and M, v |= ψslen(s) , by Proposition 4, we
have (w, v) ∈ J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM . Thus
(w, v) ∈
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM
Hence as
JπKM = J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤)KM
= J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM ∪ J?⊤KM
=
⋃
s∈S0(I)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM ∪ J?⊤KM
we have (w, v) ∈ JπKM . Hence, given
⋂
(R ∪ {JπKM})[w] ⊆ JπKM [w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM we have
M, v |= [+π]χ, as required.
(⇐) Suppose that M,w |= [+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ) → (ψslen(s) → [+π]χ)). We will show
that
⋂
(R ∪ {JπKM})[w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM . Take any v and suppose (w, v) ∈
⋂
(R ∪ {JπKM}). We
need to show that v ∈ J[+π]χKM . If v = w, given M,w |= [+π]χ we are done. So suppose
v 6= w. Since (w, v) ∈
⋂
(R ∪ {JπKM}) =
⋂
(R)∩ JπKM , we have (w, v) ∈ JπKM . Reasoning as
we did in the proof of EA4∩, we get
(w, v) ∈ JπKM iff for some s
′ ∈ S0(I), w ∈ Js
′(ϕ,ψ)KM and v ∈ Jψs′
len(s′)
KM
Given that M,w |=
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) → [+π]χ)), we have in particular
M,w |= s′(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψs′
len(s)
→ [+π]χ)
Thus from w ∈ Js′(ϕ,ψ)KM we get M,w |= (ψs′
len(s)
→ [+π]χ). And given (w, v) ∈
⋂
R and
v ∈ Jψs′
len(s′)
KM , we get M, v |= [+π]χ, as required.
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Given the Claim, we have
M,w |= [+π]χ
iff M+π, w |= χ
iff
⋂
(R ∪ {JπKM})[w] ⊆ JχKM+π
iff
⋂
(R ∪ {JπKM})[w] ⊆ J[+π]χKM
iff M,w |= [+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(Ii)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) → [+π]χ)) ( by the Claim above))
3. Axiom EA6∩:
M,w |= [+π]∀χ iff M+π, w |= ∀χ iff JχKM+π = W
+π iff J[+π]χKM = W iff M,w |= ∀[+π]χ
Claim. L+ is complete with respect to the class of ∩-models.
Proof. The proof follows the approach presented above for L!.
Soundness and completeness of L⇑ As before, we first consider soundness. Before proving
the main claim, we introduce a lemma about the formulas occurring in the reduction axioms.
Lemma 8. Let M = 〈W,R, V, Ag∩〉 be a ∩-model, w a world in M , π ∈ Π∗ be a program with
normal form
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)) ∪ (?⊤). Then
1. M,w |= π∩(χ) iff there is an R ∈ R : (R ∩ JπKM )[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
2. M,w |= [⇑ π]χ ∧ π<(χ) iff w ∈ J[⇑ π]χKM and JπK
<
M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
Proof.
Item 1: (⇒) Let M,w |= π∩(χ), i.e.,
M,w |= [⇑ π]χ ∧
∨
J⊆I
(
J(ϕ) ∧0
(
(
∨
s∈S0(I):
s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s)))→ [⇑ π]χ
))
We need to show that there is an R ∈ R : (R∩ JπKM )[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM . Note first that we have
M,w |=
∨
J⊆I
(
J(ϕ) ∧0
(
(
∨
s∈S0(I):
s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s)))→ [⇑ π]χ
))
Then, there is a J ⊆ I such that M,w |= J(ϕ) and
M,w |= 0
(
(
∨
s∈S0(I):
s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s)))→ [⇑ π]χ
)
Hence, there is some R ∈ R such that, for all v with Rwv
M, v |= (
∨
s∈S0(I):
s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s)))→ [⇑ π]χ (7)
Now take any u such that (w, u) ∈ R ∩ JπKM . If we show that u ∈ J[⇑ π]χKM , we are done. Note
first that given M,w |= π∩(χ), we have M,w |= [⇑ π]χ, so if w = u we are done. Suppose w 6= u.
As (w, u) ∈ R ∩ JπKM , we have (w, u) ∈ JπKM . Note that
(w, u) ∈ JπKM
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iff (w, u) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
?
(
s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤)KM
iff (w, u) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM or (w, u) ∈ J?⊤KM
iff (w, u) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM or w = u
iff (w, u) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM (since by assumption w 6= u)
iff (w, u) ∈
⋃
s∈S0(I)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM
iff ∃s⋆ ∈ S0(I)((w,u) ∈ J?s
⋆(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
KM )
iff ∃s⋆ ∈ S0(I)(w ∈ Js
⋆(ϕ,ψ)KM and u ∈ Jψs⋆
len(s⋆)
KM ) (by Prop. 4)
Thus, we have M,w |= s⋆(ϕ,ψ) and hence M,u |= ∃(s⋆(ϕ,ψ)). Recall that
s⋆(ϕ,ψ) = ϕs⋆1 ∧
len(s⋆)∧
k=2
(∃(ψs⋆
k−1
∧ ϕs⋆
k
)))
Hence M,w |= ϕs⋆1 and as M,w |= J(ϕ), we must have ϕs⋆1 = ϕj for some j ∈ J . This, together
with M,u |= ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
gives us
M,u |=
∨
s∈S0(I):
s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s))
which, given the statement 7 above, implies M,u |= [⇑ π]χ, as required.
(⇐) Suppose that there is an R ∈ R such that (R ∩ JπKM )[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM . First, note that
R ∩ JπKM is reflexive, and hence M,w |= [⇑ π]χ. Hence it remains to be shown that
M,w |=
∨
J⊆I
(
J(ϕ) ∧0
(
(
∨
s∈S0(I):
s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s)))→ [⇑ π]χ
))
It is clear that there is some J ⊆ I such that M,w |= J(ϕ), so we must show for this J that
M,w |= 0
(
(
∨
s∈S0(I):
s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s)))→ [⇑ π]χ
)
Consider R and take any v such that Rwv. We need to show that
M, v |= (
∨
s∈S0(I):
s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s)))→ [⇑ π]χ
Suppose that
M, v |=
∨
s∈S0(I):
s1∈J
(∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s))
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Then there is some s ∈ S0(I) with s1 ∈ J such that M, v |= ∃(s(ϕ,ψ)) ∧ ψslen(s) . Hence there is
some u such that M,u |= s(ϕ,ψ). Recall that
s(ϕ,ψ) = ϕs1 ∧
len(s)∧
k=2
(∃(ψsk−1 ∧ ϕsk)))
Given s1 ∈ J and M,w |= J(ϕ), we have M,w |= ϕs1 and thus M,w |= s(ϕ,ψ). This, together
with M, vψslen(s) , implies (w, v) ∈ J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM and hence (w, v) ∈ Jnf(π)KM (where
nf(π) is the normal form for π), which means (w, v) ∈ JπKM . As (w, v) ∈ R and (w, v) ∈ JπKM
we have (w, v) ∈ R ∩ JπKM . Thus given (R ∩ JπKM )[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM we have M, v |= [⇑ π]χ, as
required.
Item 2: (⇒) Let M,w |= [⇑ π]χ ∧ π<(χ). Then w ∈ J[⇑ π]χKM , so it remains to be shown
that JπK<M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM . We have M,w |= π
<(χ), i.e.,
M,w |=
∨
J⊆I
(
J(ψ)∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀
(
ψslen(s)∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(
s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)
)
→ [⇑ π]χ
)
)
)
Then, there is a J ⊆ I such that M,w |= J(ψ) and
M,w |=
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀
(
(ψslen(s) ∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)))→ [⇑ π]χ)
)
(8)
We need to show that JπK<M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM . Take any v such that (w, v) ∈ JπK
<
M , i.e., (w, v) ∈
JπKM and (v, w) 6∈ JπKM . We will show that v ∈ J[⇑ π]χKM . First, observe that
(w, v) ∈ JπKM
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
?
(
s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤)KM
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM or (w, v) ∈ J?⊤KM
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM or w = v
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM or w = v
iff (w, v) ∈
⋃
s∈S0(I)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM or w = v
iff ∃s⋆ ∈ S0(I)((w, v) ∈ J?s
⋆(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψs⋆
len(s′)
KM ) or w = v
iff ∃s⋆ ∈ S0(I)(w ∈ Js
⋆(ϕ,ψ)KM and v ∈ Jψs⋆
len(s⋆)
KM ) or w = v (by Prop. 4)
Moreover, note that
(v, w) 6∈ JπKM
iff (v, w) 6∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
?
(
s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤)KM
iff (v, w) 6∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM and (w, v) 6∈ J?⊤KM
iff (v, w) 6∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM and w 6= v
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iff (v, w) 6∈
⋃
s∈S0(I)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM and w 6= v
iff ∀s ∈ S0(I)((v,w) 6∈ J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM ) and w 6= v
iff ∀s ∈ S0(I)(v 6∈ Js(ϕ,ψ)KM or w 6∈ Jψslen(s)KM ) and w 6= v
iff ∀s ∈ S0(I)(v ∈ Js(ϕ,ψ)KM implies w 6∈ Jψslen(s)KM ) and w 6= v
Hence we have ∃s⋆ ∈ S0(I)(w ∈ Js⋆(ϕ,ψ)KM and v ∈ Jψs⋆
len(s⋆)
KM ) and ∀s ∈ S0(I)(v ∈
Js(ϕ,ψ)KM implies w 6∈ Jψslen(s)KM ). From 8, we have in particular
M,w |= s⋆(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀
(
(ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)))→ [⇑ π]χ)
We have w ∈ Js⋆(ϕ,ψ)KM , from which we get
M,w |= ∀
(
(ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)))→ [⇑ π]χ)
Thus, in particular
M, v |= (ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)))→ [⇑ π]χ
We already have v ∈ Jψs⋆
len(s⋆)
KM , so if we show that
M, v |=
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)) (9)
we will get M, v |= [⇑ π]χ, as required. Take any s′ ∈ S0(I) and suppose that M, v |= s′(ϕ,ψ).
We need to show that M, v |= ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J ¬ϕj)). Consider any u ∈ W and suppose
M,u |= ψs′
len(s′)
. Towards a contradiction, suppose that M,u |= ϕj, for some j ∈ J . Consider the
sequence s′′ := s′|〈j〉. Note that
s′′(ϕ,ψ) = ϕs′′1 ∧
len(s′′)∧
k=2
∃(ψs′′
k−1
∧ ϕs′′
k
) = s′(ϕ,ψ) ∧ ∃(ψs′
len(s′)
∧ ϕj)
Given M,u |= ψs′
len(s′)
and M,u |= ϕj, we have M, v |= ∃(ψs′
len(s′)
∧ ϕj). This, together with
M, v |= s′(ϕ,ψ) gives us M, v |= s′′(ϕ,ψ). From ∀s ∈ S0(I)(v ∈ Js(ϕ,ψ)KM implies w 6∈
Jψslen(s)KM ) we have: v ∈ Js
′′(ϕ,ψ)KM implies w 6∈ Jψs′′
len(s′′)
KM . Hence we have w 6∈ Jψs′′
len(s′′)
KM ,
i.e., M,w 6|= ψj. But since M,w |= J(ψ), we also have M,w |= ψj (contradiction). Thus we
have M, v |= ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J ¬ϕj)). As s
′ was arbitrarily picked we get statement 9 above,
which together with M, v |= ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
implies M, v |= [⇑ π]χ. Since v was picked arbitrarily, we get
JπK<M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM , as required.
(⇐) Suppose that w ∈ J[⇑ π]χKM and JπK
<
M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM . We need to show M,w |= [⇑
π]χ ∧ π<(χ). M,w |= [⇑ π]χ is immediate, so it remains to be shown that M,w |= π<(χ), i.e.,
M,w |=
∨
J⊆I
(
J(ψ)∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀
(
(ψslen(s)∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)))→ [⇑ π]χ)
))
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Clearly, there is a J ⊆ I such that M,w |= J(ψ), so it remains to be shown that;
M,w |=
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀
(
(ψslen(s) ∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)))→ [⇑ π]χ)
)
Take any s ∈ S0(I) and suppose that M,w |= s(ϕ,ψ). We need to show that
M,w |= ∀
(
(ψslen(s) ∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)))→ [⇑ π]χ
)
Take any v ∈W and suppose that
M, v |= ψslen(s) ∧
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj))
We need to show that M, v |= [⇑ π]χ. Note that, if v = w we are done, so suppose that v 6= w.
Since JπK<M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM , if we show that (w, v) ∈ JπK
<
M we are done. We show this next,
i.e., (w, v) ∈ JπKM and (v, w) 6∈ JπKM . Note that M,w |= s(ϕ,ψ) and M, v |= ψslen(s) . Hence
(w, v) ∈ J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM and thus (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s′∈S0(I)
(?s′(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψs′
len(s′)
) ∪ (?⊤)KM ,
which gives (w, v) ∈ JπKM . Towards a contradiction, suppose that (v, w) ∈ JπKM . Then
(v, w) ∈ J
⋃
s′∈S0(I)
(?s′(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψs′
len(s′)
) ∪ (?⊤)KM
Since v 6= w by assumption, (v, w) 6∈ J?⊤KM , so we must have
(v, w) ∈ J
⋃
s′∈S0(I)
(?s′(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψs′
len(s′)
)KM =
⋃
s′∈S0(I)
J?s′(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψs′
len(s′)
KM
By Lemma 1, this means that there is a finite vw-path along J
⋃
i∈I(?ϕi;A; ?ψi)KM . That is,
for some s′′ ∈ S0(I), v ∈ Jϕs′′1 KM and there are z1, z2, . . . , zlen(s′′), zlen(s′′)+1 such that z1 = v
and zlen(s′′)+1 = w and for each k ∈ {1, . . . , len(s
′′)}, (zk, zk+1) ∈ J?ϕs′′
k
;A; ?ψs′′
k
KM . Given
M,w |= J(ψ), we must have ψs′′
len(s′′)
= ψj for some j ∈ J . Let s⋆ = 〈s′′1 , . . . , s
′′
len(s′′)−1〉. As we
have
M, v |=
∧
s′∈S0(I)
(s′(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s′)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj))
In particular, we also have
M, v |= s⋆(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj)
As M, v |= s′′(ϕ,ψ), we also have M, v |= s⋆(ϕ,ψ), which gives us
M, v |= ∀(ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
→
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj) (10)
Given that ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
= ψs′′
len(s′′)−1
, we get
M, zlen(s′′) |= ψs⋆
len(s⋆)
and thus from statement 10 above we get
M, zlen(s′′) |=
∧
j∈J
¬ϕj
But then (zlen(s′′), w) 6∈ J?ϕs′′
len(s′′)
;A; ?ψs′′
len(s′′)
KM (contradiction).
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Having shown the lemmma above, we now consider the main soundness claim.
Claim. L⇑ is sound w.r.t ∩-models.
Proof. Let M = 〈W,R, V, Ag∩〉 be a ∩-model, w a world in M , π ∈ Π∗ be a program with
normal form
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)) ∪ (?⊤). The validity of EU1∩ follows from the fact
that the evidence addition transformer does not change the valuation function. The validity of
the Boolean reduction axioms EU2∩ and EU3∩ can be proven by unfolding the definitions.
1. Axiom EU4∩:
M,w |= [⇑ π]0χ
iff M⇑π, w |= 0χ
iff there is an R ∈ R+π such that R[w] ⊆ JχKM⇑π
iff there is an R ∈ R such that
(
JπK<M ∪ (JπKM ∩R)
)
[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
iff there is an R ∈ R such that JπK<M [w] ∪ (JπKM ∩R)[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
iff JπK<M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM and there is an R ∈ R such that (JπKM ∩ R)[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
iff JπK<M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM and there is an R ∈ R such that (JπKM ∩ R)[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
and w ∈ J[⇑ π]χKM (as w ∈ (JπKM ∩R)[w])
iff M,w |= [⇑ π]χ ∧ π<(χ) ∧ π∩(χ) (by Lemma 8)
2. Axiom EU5∩: We first prove the following:
Claim. (JπKM ∩
⋂
R)[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM iff M,w |= [⇑ π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ) → (ψslen(s) →
[⇑ π]χ)).
Proof. The proof is identical to the one used for the proof of the validity of ‘Axiom EA5∩’.
Note next that⋂
R
⇑π =
⋂
R∈R
(
JπK<M ∪ (JπKM ∩R)
)
= JπK<M ∪
⋂
R∈R
(JπKM ∩R) = JπK
<
M ∪ (JπKM ∩
⋂
R)
Thus,
M,w |= [⇑ π]χ
iff M⇑π, w |= χ
iff
⋂
R
⇑π[w] ⊆ JχKM⇑π
iff
⋂
R
⇑π[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
iff
(
JπK<M ∪ (JπKM ∩
⋂
R)
)
[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
iff JπK<M [w] ∪ (JπKM ∩
⋂
R)[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
iff JπK<M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM and (JπKM ∩
⋂
R)[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
iff w ∈ J[⇑ π]χKM and JπK
<
M [w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM and (JπKM ∩
⋂
R)[w] ⊆ J[⇑ π]χKM
( as w ∈
(
JπKM ∩R
)
[w])
M,w |= [⇑ π]χ ∧ π<(χ) ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) → [⇑ π]χ))
(by Lemma 8 and the Claim above)
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3. Axiom EU6∩:
M,w |= [⇑ π]∀χ iff M⇑π, w |= ∀χ iff JχKM⇑π = W
⇑π iff J[⇑ π]χKM =W iff M,w |= ∀[⇑ π]χ
Claim. L⇑ is complete w.r.t. ∩-models.
Proof. The follows the same steps used to prove completeness of L!.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We recall the theorem:
Theorem 3 L⊕ is sound and strongly complete with respect to lex models.
We first introduce some lemmas. During our discussion of evidence upgrade in ∩-models, we
showed in Lemma 8 that [⇑ π]χ∧π<(χ) is true at a state w in a ∩-modelM if [⇑ π]χ is true at w
and JπK<M [w] ⊆ J[⊕π]χKM . It is easy to see that, since the formula π
<(χ) contains no occurrences
of  (only ∀), the result transfers to lex models, as the semantics of ∀ is the same in all REL
models. Hence we have:
Lemma 9. Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, lex〉, w a world in M , π ∈ Π∗ be a program with normal
form
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)) ∪ (?⊤). Then
M,w |= [⊕π]χ ∧ π<(χ) iff w ∈ J[⊕π]χKM and JπK
<
M [w] ⊆ J[⊕π]χKM
Proof. Follows from Lemma 8.
We now introduce another lemma which will be useful in the proof of the reduction axioms.
Lemma 10. Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, lex〉, w a world in M , π ∈ Π∗ be a program with normal
form
⋃
s∈S0(I)
(?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)) ∪ (?⊤). Then
(lex(〈R,〉) ∩ JπKM )[w] ⊆ J[⊕π]χKM
iff
M,w |= [+π]χ ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) → [⊕π]χ))
Proof. Straightforward.
We now show one more lemma, before presenting the proof system L+
lex
. With these lemmas in
place, the proofs of the validity of the reduction axioms in this system will be almost immediate.
Lemma 11. Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, lex〉, w a world in M , π ∈ Π∗ be a program and ϕ a
formula. Then
(lex(〈R,〉) ∩ JπKM )[w] ⊆ JϕKM and JπK
<
M [w] ⊆ JϕKM
iff
lex(〈R⊕π,⊕π〉)[w] ⊆ JϕKM
Proof. Straighforward.
We now turn to the main soundness claim.
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Claim. L⊕ is sound w.r.t. lex-models.
Proof. LetM = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, lex〉, w a world inM , π be an evidence program with normal form⋃
s∈S0(I)
(?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)) ∪ (?⊤).
1. Axiom ⊕EA4: Note that this same axiom was called EA4∩ in the system L
+
∩ for ∩-models. The
effects on evidence possession (as expressed by 0-formulas) of evidence addition in ∩-models
are the same as the effects of prioritized evidence addition in lex models; in both cases, the
piece of evidence JπKM is added to the initial body of evidence R. Thus, it is easy to see that
the proof of the validity of EA4∩ in ∩-models can be straightforwardly adapted to show the
validity of ⊕EA4 in lex models.
2. Axiom ⊕EA5:
M,w |= [⊕π]χ
iff M+π, w |= χ
iff lex(R⊕π,⊕π)[w] ⊆ JχK
M+
⊕π
iff lex(R⊕π,⊕π)[w] ⊆ J[⊕π]χKM
iff (lex(〈R,〉) ∩ JπKM )[w] ⊆ J[⊕π]χKM and JπK
<
M [w] ⊆ J[⊕π]χKM (by Lemma 11)
iff M,w |= [⊕π]χ ∧ π<(χ) ∧
∧
s∈S0(I)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ (ψslen(s) → [⊕π]χ))(by Lemmas 9, 10)
3. Axiom EA6∩:
M,w |= [⊕π]∀χ iff M⊕π, w |= ∀χ iff JχKM⊕π = W
⊕π iff J[⊕π]χKM = W iff M,w |= ∀[⊕π]χ
Claim. L⊕ is complete w.r.t. lex-models.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps used above to prove completeness for other proof systems
with dynamic modalities.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We recall the theorem:
Theorem 4 Lc is sound and strongly complete with respect to REL models.
The soundness proof is straighforward. We focus on completeness. The proof is based on the
the completeness-via-canonicity approach. In particular, we construct of a canonical REL model
for each Lc-consistent theory T0. This model is almost identical to the pre-model used in the
completeness proof for Llex.
Definition 46 (Canonical model for T0). A canonical model for T0 is a structure M
c =
〈W c, 〈Rc,c〉, V c, Agc〉 with:
– W c := {T | T is a maximally consistent theory and R∀T0T}
– Rc := {R0ϕ | ϕ ∈ Lc and (∃0ϕ) ∈ T0}
– c is some preorder on Rc
– V c is a valuation function given by V c(p) := ‖p‖
– Agc is an aggregator for W c with
Ag
c(〈R,〉) =
{
Rpi if 〈R,〉 = 〈Rc⊕JpiKMc ,c⊕JpiKMc 〉
W c ×W c otherwise
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where:
– R∀, and each R0ϕ are defined in the same way as in Definition 38.
– for each ϕ ∈ Lc, ‖ϕ‖ := {T ∈ W
c | ϕ ∈ T}
– for each sequence of evidence programs pi, Rpi ⊆ W c ×W c is given by: RpiTS iff for all ϕ ∈ Lc:
piϕ ∈ T ⇒ ϕ ∈ S.
We first show that this canonical model is indeed a REL model.
Proposition 8. M c is a REL model.
Proof. In order to show that M c is an REL model, we have to show that:
1. Rc is a family of evidence, i.e., every R ∈ R is a preorder.
2. R0⊤ = W c ×W c, i.e., the trivial evidence order is an element of Rc, as required.
3. Rpi is a preorder for each pi, and thus Agc is well-defined.
The proofs of all three items are analogous to the ones given in Proposition 2.
Having established that M c is a REL model, we prove now the standard lemmas to show that
the canonical model works as expected.
Lemma 12 (Existence Lemma for ∀). ‖∃ϕ‖ 6= ∅ iff ‖ϕ‖ 6= ∅.
Proof. Same as in Lemma 2.
Lemma 13 (Existence Lemma for pi). Let pi = 〈π1, . . . , πn〉 be arbitrary. T ∈ ‖♦piϕ‖ iff
there is an S ∈ ‖ϕ‖ such that RpiTS.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 14 (Existence Lemma for 0). T ∈ ‖0ϕ‖ iff there is an R ∈ Rc such that R[T ] ⊆
‖ϕ‖.
Proof. Same as in Lemma 4.
Lemma 15 (Truth Lemma). For every formula ϕ ∈ Lc, we have: JϕKMc = ‖ϕ‖.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 5.
Lemma 16. Lc is strongly complete with respect to the class of REL models.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 6.
4.3 PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We recall the theorem:
Theorem 5 L⊕c is sound and complete with respect to REL models.
We consider soundness first.
Claim. The axioms PEA1-PEA6 are valid.
Proof. Let M = 〈W, 〈R,〉, V, Ag〉 be an REL model, w a world in M and pi = 〈π1, . . . , πn〉 be a
sequence of evidence programs with normal form
⋃
s∈S0(Ii)
(?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)) ∪ (?⊤) for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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1. Axiom PEA4: We first prove the following:
Claim. There is an k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that JπkKM [w] ⊆ J[⊕pi]χKM iff M,w |= [⊕pi]χ ∧∨
1≤i≤n(
∧
s∈S0(Ii)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕pi]χ))).
Proof. (⇒) Suppose there is an k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that JπkKM [w] ⊆ J[⊕pi]χKM . As πk is an
evidence program, JπkKM is reflexive and thus M,w |= [⊕pi]χ. It remains to be shown that
M,w |=
∨
1≤i≤n
(
∧
s∈S0(Ii)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕pi]χ))) (11)
To show (11), it suffices to find one i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
M,w |=
∧
s∈S0(Ii)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕pi]χ))
Consider i = k, take any s ∈ S0(Ik) and suppose that M,w |= s(ϕ,ψ). We need to show
that M,w |= ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕pi]χ). Take any v ∈ W and suppose M, v |= ψslen(s) . If we show
that M, v |= [⊕pi]χ, we are done. Given M,w |= s(ϕ,ψ) and M, v |= ψslen(s) , by Proposition
4, we have (w, v) ∈ J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM . Thus
(w, v) ∈
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM
Hence as
JπkKM = J
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤)KM
= J
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM ∪ J?⊤KM
=
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM ∪ J?⊤KM
we have (w, v) ∈ JπkKM . Hence, given JπkKM [w] ⊆ J[⊕pi]χKM we have M, v |= [⊕pi]χ, as
required.
(⇐) Suppose that M,w |= [⊕pi]χ∧
∨
1≤i≤n(
∧
s∈S0(Ii)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕pi]χ))). Then
there is some k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
M,w |=
∧
s∈S0(Ik)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕pi]χ))) (12)
We will show that JπkKM [w] ⊆ J[⊕pi]χKM . Take any v and suppose (w, v) ∈ JπkKM . We need
to show that v ∈ J[⊕pi]χKM . If v = w, given M,w |= [⊕pi]χ we are done. So suppose v 6= w.
Note that
(w, v) ∈ JπkKM
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
?
(
s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
∪ (?⊤)KM
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM or (w, v) ∈ J?⊤KM
iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM or w = v
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iff (w, v) ∈ J
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
(
?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)
)
KM (as w 6= v by assumption )
iff (w, v) ∈
⋃
s∈S0(Ik)
J?s(ϕ,ψ);A; ?ψslen(s)KM
iff for some s′ ∈ S0(Ik), (w, v) ∈ J?s
′(ϕ);A; ?ψs′
len(s′)
KM
iff for some s′ ∈ S0(Ik), w ∈ Js
′(ϕ)KM and v ∈ Jψs′
len(s′)
KM (by Prop. 4)
Given (12), we have in particular
M,w |= s′(ϕ)→ ∀(ψs′
len(s)
→ [⊕pi]χ)
Thus from w ∈ Js′(ϕ)KM we get M,w |= ∀(ψs′
len(s)
→ [⊕pi]χ). And given v ∈ Jψs′
len(s′)
KM we
get M, v |= [⊕pi]χ, as required.
Given the Claim, we have
M,w |= [⊕pi]0χ
iff M⊕pi , w |= 0χ
iff there is an R ∈ R ∪ {JπiKM | i = 1, . . . , n} such that R[w] ⊆ JχKM⊕pi
iff there is an R ∈ R ∪ {JπiKM | i = 1, . . . , n} such that R[w] ⊆ J[⊕pi]χKM
iff there is an R ∈ R such that R[w] ⊆ J[⊕pi]χKM
or there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that JπiKM [w] ⊆ J[⊕pi]χKM
iff M,w |= 0[⊕pi]χ
or M,w |= [⊕pi]χ ∧
∨
1≤i≤n
(
∧
s∈S0(Ii)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕pi]χ)))
( by the Claim above)
iff M,w |= 0[⊕pi]χ ∨
(
[⊕pi]χ ∧
∨
1≤i≤n
(
∧
s∈S0(Ii)
(s(ϕ,ψ)→ ∀(ψslen(s) → [⊕pi]χ)))
)
2. Axiom EA5: M,w |= [⊕pi]ρχ iff M⊕pi, w |= ρχ iff 〈W⊕JpiKM , 〈R⊕JpiKM ,⊕JpiKM
〉, V ⊕JpiKM , Ag⊕JpiKM 〉, w |= ρχ iff
〈W⊕JpiKM⊕JρKM , 〈R⊕JpiKM⊕JρKM ,⊕JpiKM⊕JpiKM 〉, V ⊕JpiKM⊕JρKM , Ag⊕JpiKM⊕JpiKM 〉, w |= χ
iff M,w |= pi⊕ρχ
3. Axiom EA6: M,w |= [⊕pi]∀χ iff M⊕pi, w |= ∀χ iff JχKM+⊕pi = W
+⊕pi iff J[⊕pi]χKM = W iff
M,w |= ∀[⊕pi]χ.
Claim. L⊕c is complete w.r.t. REL models.
Proof. Once we have established the validity of the reduction axioms, the proof is standard and
follows the same steps used above to prove completeness for other proof systems with dynamic
modalities.
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